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0. Introduction 
The mathematical formalization of probability theory was completed in the 1930s by 
Kolmogorov. Let us mention that it was hundred years later than Cauchy’s papers had 
given the mathematical formalization for mathematical analysis. The century delay is 
due to the complexity of the notion of probability and related notions. Indeed, proba- 
bility laws are concerned with the future and not with the past, i.e., with events that 
may happen in the future rather than with events that have happened. The distinction 
between the past (what has already happened), the present (the moment of observation 
and prediction), and the future (what may happen) is crucial in the ideological basis 
of probability theory. The opposition between constatation of what has happened and 
prediction of what may happen is the special feature of probability theory, and it is 
present in no other branch of mathematics in such a strong form. 
Philosophical arguments on the nature of probability last till today. It is not easy, 
thinking on probability, to distinguish between objective and subjective. Von Mises 
pointed out this difficulty, when he stated that the absence of knowledge about the true 
state of affairs cannot be a base of the hypothesis of equal chances. Von Mises wrote 
[ 151 (the citation is from the English translation [ 16, p. 751): 
“If we know nothing about the stature of six men, we may presume that they are all 
of equal height. (. . .) This presumption may be true or false; it can also be described as 
more or less probable, in the colloquial meaning of this word. In the same way we can 
presume that the six sides of a die, of whose properties we know nothing definite, have 
equal probabilities. This is, however, only a conjecture, and nothing more. Experiment 
may show that it is false, and the pair of dice used in our first lecture was an illustration 
of such a case”. 
Paradoxes in probability theory are well known. A common example is: 
we easily agree with the following outcome of 20 trials of fair coin 
tossing: 01111011001101110001, on the other hand, we wonder the result 
00000000000000000000. However, both results have equal chances. It is plausible that 
our reaction is caused by our belief that the first string is complicated, i.e., has only 
complicated descriptions and the second string is simple, i.e. has a simple description 
(the question if, in a random experiment, a string which has small probability and 
is simple may occur at all, needs a further discussion). The paper [22] starts with 
an example of that kind; the problem is discussed in the special Addendum in that 
paper, called “A timid criticism regarding probability theory”. We will return to this 
discussion in the end of the present paper (see Philosophical Supplement). 
This paper consists of 12 sections. 
In Section 1, we fix certain general ideas on randomness regarding infinite binary 
sequences to try, in the next sections, to find mathematical formalizations of those 
ideas, based on the theory of algorithms. The first attempt is made in Section 2; there, 
the rigorous notion of a lawless sequence is proposed as such a formalization; however, 
we discover fast that formalization is not appropriate. In Section 3, we consider the 
frequency approach to randomness, going back to R. von Mises; the resulting rigorous 
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notion of a random sequence is called stochasticness. In Sections 4 and 5, certain 
principles are stated, which, we believe, any appropriate formalization must satisfy. 
In Sections 6 and 7, an approach to randomness based on the notions of a game and 
of a strategy is investigated; we declare that random sequences are exactly those against 
which we cannot win in the game. As a mathematically rigorous notion reflecting that 
approach, the notion of an unpredictable sequence is defined. That notion turns out to 
be more restrictive than the notion of stochasticness (7.4 and 7.7). 
In Section 8, the complexity approach (more exactly, the entropy approach) to the 
notion of a random sequence is discussed. That approach is due to A.N. Kolmogorov. 
There, chaotic sequences are considered, that is, those sequences whose initial seg- 
ments’ entropies grow sufficiently fast. All chaotic sequences turn out to be unpre- 
dictable (8.9), the truth of the converse is an open question. 
In Section 9 we find out how fast the entropies of initial segments of a sequence 
which has certain features of randomness may or must grow. There, the role of mono- 
tone strategies is clarified and the important notion of a natural sequence is introduced. 
In Section 10, the ideas of the previous sections are applied to tuples, or finite 
sequences. From the point of view of practice, as well as of philosophy, it is the 
investigation of randomness of finite sequences that has the main interest. Infinite 
sequences have to be considered as upper approximations to finite sequences. However, 
dealing with finite sequences meets considerable difficulties. As to the class of infinite 
sequences, we may hope to divide it into two parts - the subclass of random sequences 
and the subclass of non-random sequences. Such a partition is impossible for the class 
of finite sequences; thus in this case we have no choice but to evaluate the amount 
(or the degree) of randomness of a finite sequence. 
The questions which remain still open are listed in Section 11 and Section 12 is a 
philosophical supplement. 
For convenience of the reader we draw a pictorial representation of relations between 
classes of infinite sequences corresponding to four main refinements of the notion of 
randomness: chaoticness, unpredictability, monotonic unpredictability and stochasticness. 
def.n $9 5.1 7 .4n gd7.i 
L----++-~,,,ir 
monotonically unpredictable 
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We write the numbers of propositions where the corresponding inclusions and non- 
inclusions are formulated. The question, whether the inclusion of the set of chaotic 
sequences in the set of unpredictable sequences is strict, is open. 
A brief summary of the notations followed in this paper is listed below. 
N the set of natural numbers (i.e. of positive integers) 
Q the set of rational numbers 
R the set of real numbers 
!Z the set of infinite binary sequences 
E the set of binary tuples, or of finite binary sequences 
9 the set of infinite binary sequences that extend the tuple s 
I” the set of binary tuples of length m 
I Qm the set of binary tuples of length not greater than m 
Irn the set of binary tuples of length m that extend the tuple s 
I”f s = (at,. . . ,a,), b E (0, l} then s-b denotes the tuple (al,. . . ,a,, 6) 
If s=(a ,,..., a,), t=(b ,,..., bk) then s”t denotes the tuple (al,. . . ,a,, bl,. . . , bk) 
If a=(al,a;!,...) 1s a tuple or an infinite sequence then aln = (al,a2,. . .,a,), and 
a(j) = Uj 
lb(x) 
the logarithm of x to the base 2 
ln(x ) the logarithm of x to the base e 
IAl the cardinality of A (if A is a set) 
ISI the length of s (if s E 3) 
lb(s), l(s) the length of s 
V the uniform Bernoulli distribution, or the uniform Bernoulli measure 
[xl the greatest integer less than or equal to x 
1. The intuitive concept of randomness 
The concept of randomness arises from the viewpoint on random things as on things 
that have unpredictable behavior. The most fruitful way of converting intuitive con- 
cepts of such a kind into exact mathematical notions is their application to a class of 
phenomena having the rigorous mathematical description. Coin tossing produces such a 
class of phenomena, so we will consider the concept of randomness for infinite binary 
sequences. 
The restriction to binary case is certainly strong, however all facts discovered for 
that case can be extended via coding to the sequences of objects of an arbitrary nature 
(though some quantitative laws may be slightly changed). 
Before further exposition we would stress on the following point. Our opinion about 
the randomness of a sequence depends on accepted probabilistic model, which must 
be chosen in advance. The following simple example illustrates this point. Let us toss 
a symmetric coin and let us consider a sequence of outcomes of mutually independent 
trials of the experiment. We expect that in every long initial segment of the sequence 
there are ones about as many as zeros, and if the number of zeros is sufficiently greater 
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than the number of ones we consider this fact as an evidence of nonrandomness of 
the sequence. If our coin is not symmetric (for example, one side has probability $ 
and the other side has f ) and the sequence has ones about as many as zeros then 
we consider it as non-random: in any random sequence there are zeros about twice as 
many as ones. 
In further exposition we will consider symmetric coins as well as asymmetric coins, 
for which the probability p of one is not equal to the probability q of zero (in some 
cases these probabilities will depend on the number of a trial; more complicated prob- 
ability distributions will also be considered). However we will point out every case of 
using an asymmetric coin or a coin with changing probabilities or even with a more 
complicated distribution. If it not stated otherwise all the trials are mutually independent 
and the probabilities of one in each trial is equal to i, 
Remark. It is known that in any mathematical treatment of randomness, an infinite 
sequence having positive measure is treated as random with respect to the measure in 
consideration. (Speaking on the measure of a sequence we have in mind the measure 
of the single-element set consisting of that sequence.) Therefore every sequence may 
be random with respect to an appropriate non-continuous measure. This remark can 
be applied also to any refinement of the notion of randomness being developed in 
this paper - to typicalness, to chaoticness, to unpredictability, to stochasticness. So 
the reader must not be confused when he realizes that, say, the sequence (O,O, 0,. .) 
containing zeros only is unpredictable with respect to some exotic measure. 
2. A first attempt to develop the concept of a random infinite sequence: 
lawfulness and lawlessness 
We would define randomness as the absence of any law. Thus we need to make 
clear what a law is. Generally, this means that the terms of a given (binary) sequence 
cannot be mutually independent, or more exactly, lawfulness is the presence of such 
dependence. The most easy kind of such dependence is the existence of some nontrivial 
information about a term of the sequence in its preceding terms. 
We can accept that this information is nontrivial in every step i.e. for every term; 
this assumption is our first approach. 
Definition 2.1. An infinite binary sequence is la\tlfUl if there is an algorithm that given 
any initial segment of the sequence outputs a nontrivial finite set of finite extensions 
of that segment such that one of these extensions is an initial segment of the sequence. 
Any infinite binary sequence which is not lawful is, by definition, lawless. 
One may believe that as lawlessness reflects some features of randomness, so out 
definition of a lawless sequence may serve as an approach to the concept of a random 
sequence. We shall see, in the end of this section, that this is not true. 
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Now we will give some terminological remarks and comments. Finite sequences are 
also called tuples. An initial segment of infinite sequence a = (uk : k E N) (N stands for 
the set of natural numbers, which begins with 1) or of finite sequence a = (uk : 1 d k <s) 
is, by definition, any tuple of the form aln = (al,. . . , a,), that is any tuple consisting of 
initial terms of the sequence (here n <s). In this case we say that the finite or infinite 
sequence a is an extension of the tuple aln, or that a extends aln. If s= ($1,. . . ,sn), 
s’= (s,,. ..,s,,s,+l) (thus s=s’ln) then we write s’=s^s,+t. 
The number of terms of tuple b is called its length and is denoted by lb(b) or l(b) 
or Ibl. In particular, lb(n) = l(n) = InI = 0, w h ere /1 stands for the empty tuple. 
In the sequel the infinite sequences will be called simply sequences. 
We will consider binary sequences and tuples, that is sequences and tuples consisting 
only of zeros and ones. The set of all binary tuples is denoted by Z, the set of all 
infinite binary sequences is denoted by Sz. We will denote by !& the set of all infinite 
binary extensions of tuple b. Any set of the form Q, is called a cone, or an interval, or a 
sphere in s2. Evidently a tuple b is an initial segment of a tuple c if and only if K& C_ Q,. 
Obviously, there is a computable bijection from N onto E, thus the notion of partial 
recursive function can be naturally extended on partial mappings from E into N, N into 
Z and E into B and on the partial mappings from z - into the set [F of all finite subsets 
of E (obviously, there is a computable bijection from N onto E). In our exposition we 
make no difference between the notions “algorithm”, “computable function”, “partial 
recursive function”. 
The algorithm from the Definition 2.1 given any initial segment aln outputs a finite 
non-empty set f(aln) C_ E such that every tuple in f(aln) extends aln. The nontriviality 
required in the definition means that the tuples from f(a[n) do not cover aln; more 
exactly, the intervals Qt, t E f(aln), do not cover the interval Q+ that is there is a 
sequence extending a 112 but extending no tuple from f(aln). 
We say that a sequence a is lawful via an algorithm f if this algorithm f is defined 
(that is it outputs a result) at least on all tuples of the form aln and for any n: 
( 1) f (aln) is a nontrivial finite set of extensions of tuple aln, and 
(2) there is a tuple t E f(aln) which is an initial segment of the sequence a. 
Now it is clear that a sequence is lawful if and only if it is lawful via some algorithm. 
To make more clear the nature of lawfulness it is convenient to consider the follow- 
ing property of a sequence that is equivalent to lawfulness. We need canonical topology 
on the set Q of all infinite binary sequences (Cantor’s discontinuum) the base of that 
topology consists of all sets of the form Qt, i.e. of all intervals. A set open in this 
topology is called efictively open if it can be represented as a union of recursively 
enumerable set of intervals. 
Theorem 2.2. A sequence a is lawful if and only if it belongs to the boundary oj 
some eflectively open set. 
Proof. Let a sequence a be lawful via an algorithm f. Let us construct a new (possibly 
not totally defined as well as f is not) algorithm g : E + E. Let s E 3. If f(s) is defined 
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and is a nontrivial set of finite extensions of s then there is a tuple r extending s such 
that the length of Y is greater than the length of any tuple in j”(s) and r extends no 
tuple in f(s); the first such Y (we assume that some effective enumeration of 3 is 
fixed) is taken as y(s). If the condition of the above sentence is not fulfilled then (I(S) 
is not defined. The set G = U, Q2,(,y) (the union is over all s such that g(s) is defined) 
is effectively open. Let us verify that a belongs to the boundary of G. This means that 
in any neighborhood of a there are points from G as well as points that do not belong 
to G. By the choice of f and by the construction of 9 and G we have a@G. On 
the other hand, every neighborhood 52, = !2,1,, of the point a intersects with G because 
Q2,(.s, C St.5 n G. 
Conversely, let a set G C Q be effectively open and let a belong to the boundary 
of G. Obviously a $G as G is open. Let G = U Q,, t E M, where M is a recursively 
enumerable set. For every s let us denote by y(s) the first tuple t E M (in the recursive 
enumeration of M) extending s (if there is no such t then g(s) is not defined). Let us 
define f(s) to be the set of all extensions of s having the same length as g(s) has except 
of g(s). One can easily verify that a is lawful via ,f (this is left to the reader). 0 
Let us recall that a meagre set (or a set of the ,first category) is any countable 
union of nowhere dense sets. Recall that a set X c Q is no&err dense if every interval 
includes another interval that does not intersect with X, i.e. if every tuple s has an 
extension t such that Q, nx is empty. We can easily verify that the boundary X of 
any open set Y C Q is nowhere dense (if fiJ n Y = 0 then Q,, has no points from X, 
thus we can take s as t; and if Q, intersects with Y then !Ss n Y includes an interval 
R, which evidently has no points from the boundary). 
Thus we have 
Corollary 2.3. The set of all Iuw$d sequences is a set oj the first categor? 
Our definition of lawfulness and lawlessness is based on the idea which is well 
known in mathematics. For example, generic sequences defined in the branch of ax- 
iomatic set theory called forcing method (see [l, ch. IV]) are lawless in a sense close 
to our sense. 
However, the concept of lawlessness cannot be considered as satisfactory approach 
to the concept of randomness because the coin tossing yields hulful sequence which 
we must consider as random. Indeed, any infinite sequence of outcomes of mutually 
independent trials of tossing a symmetric coin satisfies the law of large numbers (LLN): 
the ratio nl /n, where nl is the number of ones in the sequence’s initial segment of 
length n, tends to 4 as n tends to infinity. But 
every sequence a satisjjing LLN is law;fid. 
Indeed, let a natural number N be so large that n 1 /n > 0.4 for all n > N. Let us define 
an algorithm f such that a is lawful via ,f. Let s E E be a tuple of a length m 3 N. 
Let us denote by f(s) the set of all tuples t of length 3m extending s such that the 
number of ones among the members of t is at least 0.4 x 3m. Let us additionally define 
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f(alk) = a((k + 1) for k <IV (thus f is defined on all initial segments of a). Evidently 
a is lawful via f. 
Analogously, we can verify that any sequence of outcomes of tossing an asymmet- 
rical coin, with different probabilities of one and zero, is lawful. 
More generally, sequences obtained by coin tossing, which we consider as random, 
are lawful because they satisfy the laws of probability theory that seems to be neces- 
sary for random sequences. Therefore the notion of lawlessness cannot be an adequate 
approach to the concept of randomness, and we have to find another way to clarify 
that concept, a way which would be more adequate to our intuition. 
3. The frequency approach to the concept of randomness: tochasticness 
Thus the law of large numbers makes it impossible to interpret randomness in pure 
negative sense, i.e. as lawlessness. Let us look whether it is possible to obtain a 
positive effect from this observation: if the (intuitively) random sequences satisfy LLN 
(and probably another laws) then it seems quite natural to declare this law (probably 
together with another laws) to be the criterion of randomness. 
However, LLN for the whole sequence only is not enough because the sequence 
(0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1, . . .) certainly is not random and satisfies LLN. Taking this into account, 
von Mises [ 19,151 suggested to require that not only the sequence but also its subse- 
quences must satisfy LLN. Of course we cannot understand this literally (let us take 
the subsequence of zero terms); however we can extract from this proposal a correct 
idea. Namely, we must restrict the ways of choosing the subsequence, in particular, 
by requiring the way of choosing to be effective (that is the way must be represented 
by an algorithm). On the other hand, it is appropriate to consider first of all only the 
ways of choice of a subsequence according the following framework: one chooses the 
terms in turn and the decision of including the current term into the subsequence does 
not depend on the value of current term (i.e. the term must be chosen before one gets 
its value). 
For example, the following way of choosing does not satisfy the latter requirement: 
to choose all terms such that the preceding and succeeding terms are equal to zero 
(i.e. a,, is chosen in the subsequence iff a,_1 = a,,+1 = 0): there is no way to know 
whether a,, will be included in the subsequence before getting the value a,+l. It is 
clear that the subsequence of the sequence 0, 1, 0, 1, 0,l . . . (evidently satisfying LLN) 
chosen according the above rule will not satisfy LLN. (However, we can prove that for 
almost all sequences a with respect to the uniform measure y the subsequence chosen 
according to this rule satisfies LLN.) 
The most general framework of formalization of the frequency approach was given 
by Kolmogorov [5, Remark 21. To this end he gave the notion of admissible rule of 
choice. Let us give an account of his definition. Let us imagine that Man step by step 
and according to some ruIe of choice points out the number of a term the value of 
which he wants to know. Let us require that before its (correct) value becomes known 
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to Man4 he must decide whether he will include this term in the subsequence. All 
information that Man possesses is the sequence of values of known terms. 
The rule of choice (or the place selection rule) may be not totally defined, i.e. in 
some cases it may give no recommendation regarding what should be done - in this 
case we get a finite subsequence. 
Warning. We use the term “subsequence” in a non-standard sense. Usually the term 
“a subsequence of a sequence x = (xl ,x2,. . ,x,, . .)” means any sequence of the form 
(xm, x,, , . . ,x,, , . . .) where 
ml <m2< .f. <mk<mkfl.‘. (*I 
Following Kolmogorov, we reject the condition (*) and accept that the terms of a 
subsequence can be arranged in any way. For example, if we rearrange in an arbitrary 
way the terms of the sequence x then the obtained sequence is considered to be a 
subsequence of x. By definition, if we apply a rule of choice to a sequence then the 
chosen terms are enumerated, in the capacity of terms of the subsequence obtained, 
according to the order in which they are chosen (not according to the order in which 
they are arranged in the given sequence!). 
Definitions 3.1. Let 0 be a rule of choice and a be a binary sequence. Assume that 
after application of 0 to a we get a finite sequence or we get an infinite sequence 
satisfying the law of large numbers, i.e. the limit of the ratio (number of ones in the 
initial segment)/(the length of the segment) equals to i (if the obtained sequence is 
finite we demand nothing). In this case we will say that a is stochastic with respecat 
to 0. If the obtained sequence is infinite and does not satisfy the law of large numbers 
then we say that a is non-stochastic with respect to 0. 
Kolmogorov’s formalization consists not only of this most general definition of the 
rule of choice but also of the requirement (after Church) that the rule of choice is 
computable, i.e. the rule of choice is an algorithm. 
Definition 3.2. Let us call an (infinite) binary sequence stochastic if it is stochastic 
with respect to any computable rule of choice. 
Thus, stochasticness is the second (after lawlessness) candidate to refine the informal 
concept of randomness. The set of stochastic sequences is large in the measure-theoretic 
sense (but not in the sense of category). The measure being implicitly present in our 
consideration is the measure connected with independent trials of tossing a fair coin. 
Let us now proceed to the consideration of the situations related with the more general 
class of measures. 
Definitions 3.3. (1) c-algebras. A a-algebra in X is a collection of subsets of X which 
contains X (as an element) and is closed under the two operations: of complementation 
and of countable union. For any collection 9 of subsets of X, there exists a smallest 
4 In the sequel we will say that Man (or the rule of choice) finds out the corresponding value. 
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o-algebra in X in which 9 is included as a subcollection; that o-algebra is called the 
a-algebra generated by F. 
(2) Measures and distributions. Generally speaking, a measure on X is a countably 
additive function whose domain is a a-algebra in X and whose range is in [0, +co). 
We say that a measure is a probabilistic measure or a probability distribution if its 
value on X is equal to 1. 
(3) Measures on !S. In the sequel, a measure on Sz will be understood in a more 
restricted sense: it is a probabilistic measure defined on the a-algebra generated by the 
collection of all intervals in Q. So any measure cp on Sz is completely determined by its 
values on the intervals, that is by the values ~(52,). Let us consider a function f with 
the domain E: f(s) = cp(Q,). This f, related to a measure cp, is called a quasimeasure. 
Often it is convenient to denote a measure and a quasimeasure, correlated one to 
another, by the same letter. Of course, the notion of a quasimeasure can be defined 
independently. 
(4) Quasimeasures. A function p. . E + [0, +oo) is a quasimeasure on E (or simply 
quasimeasure) if p(s) = p(s ^ O) + p(s -1) f or all s and p(/i) = 1. For any quasimeasure 
p let us consider the measure denoted by the same letter p and defined on the family of 
all intervals: p(sZ,) = p(s). As p(Q) = p(Qd) = p(A) = 1 this measure is a probabilistic 
measure or a probability distribution. 
(5) Bernoulli measures. Let p = (~1, ~2,. . . , pk, . . .) be a sequence of reals from the 
segment [0, 11, k E N. Let us define a quasimeasure p by the equality p(s) = n, GkGn rk, 
where s = (si, ..,sn), n=Is1 andI;G=pk ifSk=l andr-k=l-ppk ifSk=O(Forex- 
ample, if p1 = 0.3 and p2 = 0.6 then p( (1,0)) = 0.12.) The corresponding measure on 
R is called generalized Bernoulli measure (or generalized Bernoulli distribution) with 
parameter p. If for all k E N it holds pk = p then this measure is called Bernoulli mea- 
sure (or Bernoulli distribution). Finally, if p = i then this Bernoulli measure is called 
the uniform measure (or uniform distribution). In the sequel the uniform measure will 
be denoted by the letter y, thus y(C&) = 2-lSl. 
(6) Computability. Of special interest is the case of computable quasimeasure. The 
computability of a quasimeasure means that all its values are computable real numbers 
and the mapping p : E + [0, +cc) itself is computable. The measure on 52 is called 
computable if it is related to a computable quasimeasure. We will not give here the 
definition of a computable real number, or the definition of a computable mapping from 
Z into the set of computable real numbers. It is sufficient for our purposes to consider 
only quasimeasures with rational values. We assume that the notion of a computable 
mapping (i.e. a mapping determined by an algorithm) from Z into the set Q of rational 
numbers is clear. Let us mention that for every rational p (more generally, computable 
real p) the Bernoulli measure with parameter p is computable. 
Theorem 3.4. For the uniform measure: the measure of the set consisting oj’all the se- 
quences that are non-stochastic with respect to aJxed rule of choice is equal to zero. 
The set of computable rules is countable; therefore we get: 
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Corollary 3.5. For the unijtirm measure: the meusure of the set of all stochustic 
sequences is equal to 1. 
We do not prove now Theorem 3.4 because we will prove below the more general 
Theorem 3.13. Moreover, we will prove in Section 8 a stronger Theorem 8.7 (and its 
proof will be simpler than all known proofs of Theorem 3.4). 
Theorem 3.4 and Corollary 3.5 are evident particular cases of the analogous theorem 
and corollary for Bernoulli measures ~ see Theorem 3.6 and Corollary 3.7 below. The 
notions of “stochasticness with respect to a given rule” and “stochasticness” that are 
present in those assertions are defined similarly to the uniform case; the difference is 
that the constant $ in the formulation of LLN is replaced by parameter p. 
Theorem 3.6. For a Bernoulli meusure: the meusure of the set qf all sequences that 
are non-stochastic lvith respect to u jxed rule of’ choice is eyuul to 0. 
Corollary 3.7. For u Bernoulli measure: the measure of the set of ml1 stochastit 
sequences is equal to 1. 
In their turn, Theorem 3.6 and Corollary 3.7 are the particular cases of the more 
general assertions 3.10 and 3.11 for generalized Bernoulli measures. However, we have 
to define first what is a stochustic sequence rvith respect to a generalized Bernoulli 
measure on Q. As we will see the situation is more complicated in this case. In the case 
of Bernoulli measure we gave the definition of LLN for a sequence and then applied 
automatically this definition to a subsequence. Now we have to take into account that 
the probability of appearing of 1 on the seventh (say) place can be different for different 
subsequences. 
To avoid iterated indices let us write u(m) instead of a,,,. 
Definition 3.8. Let we are given a generalized Bernoulli measure with parameter 
(p(l),p(2) ,..., p(m) ,... ). A sequence a= (u(l),a(2) ,..., u(m), . .) is called .stochostic 
with respect to a rule 0 if the subsequence b = (a( ml ), a(q), . . .) obtained from a by 
the application of 0 is finite or satisfies the following condition: 
u(nz~ > + + a(w) ph)+-.+p(mk)+O 
k k 
as k + 00. (The sum u(ml) + . + a(mk) is equal to the number of ones among the 
k first terms of the sequence b.) 
Definition 3.9. For a generalized Bernoulli measure: a sequence is called stochastic if 
it is stochastic with respect to every computable rule of choice. 
Theorem 3.10. For a generalized Bernoulli measure: the measure qf the set of ull 
sequences that are non-stochastic with respect to a ,fixed rule of choice is equal to 0. 
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Corollary 3.11. For a generalized Bernoulli measure: the measure of the set of all 
stochastic sequences i equal to 1. 
Now we will prove Theorem 3.10 in the important particular case: the case of the 
so called quasiuniform measures. 
Definition 3.12. A generalized Bernoulli measure with the parameter (pr, ~2,. . . , 
pm,... ) is called quasiunzform if pm 4 i as m + 00. 
Thus we will prove the following theorem: 
Theorem 3.13. For a quasiuniform measure: the measure of all sequences that are 
non-stochastic with respect o a fixed rule of choice is equal to 0. 
Corollary 3.14. For a quasiuntform easure: the measure of the set of all stochastic 
sequences i equal to 1. 
Proof of Theorem 3.13. Let p be a quasiuniform measure with the parameter (~1, 
P2,...,Pll,.~. ), let 0 be a rule of choice. Evidently it suffices to prove the following 
assertion: if s>O then the p-measure of the set 
A = {a E 52: Vno 3n3no [the subsequence h = h(a) chosen from a according to the 
rule 0 has >n terms and there are at least (0.5 + &)n ones among its n first terms]} 
is equal to 0 (the case when the number of zeros is at least (0.5 + E)IZ is analogous). 
Let us begin with the remark: the number 
p = P(E) = (0.5 + s)0~5+C(o.5 - .s)O~s-C 
satisfies the inequality p >0.5 if E <0.5 (for the proof we can take the logarithm and 
compute the derivative). Let p = 0.5 + 6, 6 > 0. 
Lemma 3.13.1. For n E N, let B, be the set of all sequences s E 3 of the length n 
such that there are at least (0.5 + c)n ones among terms of s. For any n B,, has at 
most (1 Jp)” elements. 
Proof. For a sequence s, let us define v(s)= (0.5 + s)n(‘)(0.5 - a)n(O) where n(1) 
and n(0) are the number of ones and the number of zeros in s, respectively. Then 
c sEB, v(s)<[(O.5 + E) + (0.5 - E)]” = 1 and on the other hand v(s)>pn if s E B,. 
These two inequalities yield the inequality IB,( <(l/p”). 0 
Let d, = p,, -0.5. We may assume that Id,1 < 6/2 for all iz (if this is not the case then 
we can replace every d,, such that Id,, > 612 with zero; on all intervals the measure p 
is not greater than the new measure ,u’ multiplied by some constant, and therefore any 
set having zero p’-measure has also zero p-measure). 
Thus, let us assume that Vnld,l <b/2. 
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Lemma 3.13.2. For any n and jbr any s E { 0, 1 }” the p-measure of the set D, = {a E 9: 
the subsequence b chosen from a by application of the rule 0 has at least n terms 
and the initial segment of b wCth the length n is equal to s} is not greater than 
2_“( 1 + 8)n. 
Proof. The lemma will be proved by induction on IZ. The base of induction (n = 0; 
in this case s = il and D, = Q) is obvious. The induction step easily follows from the 
inequality ,u(D,~-, ) < p(D.T)(0.5 + b/2), where s E { 1, O}“, i E { 1, 0). Let us prove this 
inequality. 
Let a E 9y-i. Let Man be choosing a subsequence of a according to 0. Let V C N 
be the set of numbers of all the terms of a the value of which Man found out before 
choosing (n + 1)th term. Let 1 be the number of (n + 1)th chosen term of a and let 
U = VU { 1). Let us define E(a) = {a’ E Q: ah = ak for all k E U} and let us define 
C(a) = {a’ E R: a: = ak for all k E V}. Clearly, al = i, E(a) = {a’ E C(a): ai = i}, and 
this involves p(E(a))dp(C(a))(O.S + 6/2). For fixed s, i we can easily verify that if 
al, a2 belong to 0,~~ and E(al) # E(az) then C(al)n C(az)=0. On the other hand. 
D,-i = U, E D, ., E(a) and U, E D, ., C(a) C D,s. Therefore p(D.Y-i)<p(DS)(0.5 + b/2). 0 
Lemmas 3.13.1 and 3.13.2 imply that for any IZ, ,u(&-~, D,)<[( I + 6)/(1 +2(S)]“. 
Obviously A is included in Un,k UsES. D,, for any k E N. As the series CE, [( I + 
6)/( 1 + 26)]” converges, that inclusion implies that /i(A) = 0. 0 
3.15. In search of completeness let us give the definition of stochasticness for an 
arbitrary measure. 
Let p be a measure on s2 (below we will introduce a small restriction to simplify 
the exposition). As we will see the definition will be rather cumbersome. 
First, let us introduce some notations. Let nl,. , q be natural numbers and let 
i,, , ik belong to (0, l}. We denote by R:,~:::;~k the set of all sequences a from Q 
such that a,, = il, anz = i2,. . . , a,, = ik. (It must be stressed that we do not require that 
nl <I72 < . < nk ). Let us consider the conditional probability of mth term being equal 
to 1, i.e. the fraction ~(A:,~;::‘$” )/~L(A:,I.::;;: ). We denote this fraction by ,tl( ‘I’ :I: : : : 1 yi ) 
To simplify the exposition we will assume that if all n, are distinct, then the number 
in the denominator is not zero (it is that restriction which we mentioned above). Let 
us fix now an arbitrary sequence a E Q and an arbitrary rule of choice 0. Our goal is 
to define the meaning of expression “the sequence a is stochastic with respect to the 
rule 0”. The definition will be cumbersome because we must deal not only with the 
sequence b obtained from a by application of the rule 0 (as in the case of Bernoulli 
measure) and even not only with the way of embedding of b in a (as in the case of 
generalized Bernoulli measure), but also with the history of generating b. The process 
of generating b according to the rule 0 can be divided into two steps. In the first step 
the rule 0 constructs auxiliary sequence c which consists of all terms of the sequence 
a which the rule 0 finds out. In the second step the terms of b are chosen from c. 
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More formally: a = (a(l), a(2), . . . , a(n), . . .), c = (a(n( l)),a(n(2)), . . . ,a(n(k)), . . .) and 
the number n(k) is computed, according to 0, given the tuple (u(n( 1)). . . , u(n(k- 1))). 
Further, the rule 0 given (u(n( l)),, . . , u(n(k - 1))) (but not given u(n(k))) de- 
cides whether to include u(n(k)) in the final subsequence b. Thus, b = (u(n(kl)), 
a(n(k2 )), . . ., a(n(kj)), . . .). As we have mentioned, on both steps application of the 
rule 0 may give no result, in this case the subsequence b is finite. In the definition of 
stochasticness, we demand nothing of the subsequence b if b is finite. If b is infinite 
then the requirements are as follows: 
Let us denote by yj the conditional probability 
n(kj > 
P 1 ( 1 
4 11, n(2), . ..,n(kj - 1) 
dn(l >I, dn(2)), . . .) a(n(kj - 1) ) ’ 
Let us consider the difference 
Sj = 
r] +r2+...+9 dn(kl)) +dn(k~)) + ... +a(n(kj)) 
_i - .i 
We will say that b satisfies LLN if Sj --f 0 as j 4 IXX We will say that a is stochastic 
with respect to the rule 0 if the subsequence b obtained from a by application of 0 
is finite or satisfies LLN. 
Finally, let us call a sequence a stochastic if it is stochastic with respect to any 
computable rule of choice. 
Theorem 3.16. For u measure ,u: the measure of the set of ull sequences non- 
stochastic with respect to a jxed rule of choice is equal to 0. 
Corollary 3.17. For a measure ,LL: the measure of the set of all stochastic sequences 
is equal to 1. 
Definition 3.18. Sequences stochastic (non-stochastic) relative to a measure p will be 
called p-stochastic (p-non-stochastic, respectively). And we will allow ourselves to 
write simply stochastic and non-stochastic sequences, thus omitting the indication of 
p, in the case ,U = y (where q is the uniform Bernoulli distribution). 
4. The principle of typicalness and the majority principle 
As we have seen, the notion of lawfulness is related to the notion of a set of first 
category, and the notion of stochasticness is related to the notion of a set of measure 
1. The lawful sequences are exactly those sequences that belong to nowhere dense 
sets which are boundaries of effectively open sets (Theorem 2.2). And as we will see, 
some formalizations of the notion of randomness, not equivalent to stochasticness, also 
satisfy Corollary 3.5: that is, the set of all sequences which are random according to 
those formalizations has measure 1. All those formalizations are rather special, however 
there is a general principle involved in all of them. 
A.A. Muchnik et al. I Theoreticul Computer Science 207 (1998) 263-317 277 
That principle is the following one: no event of probability 0 can happen. More 
precisely: by an event we mean that a sequence obtained by infinite number of coin 
tossings gets into a fixed set DC 52 and by the probability of this event we mean the 
measure of D; then after Wald [2628] we postulate that a random sequence belongs 
to no set of measure 0. 
Literal understanding this principle leads to contradiction, as every “one-element” 
event (that is, the event “to be equal to some fixed sequence”) has zero probability. 
A reasonable refinement is as follows: no predicted event of probability 0 can happen. 
Predictions are expressed in a before fixed language. We will suppose that language is 
countable (that is, it has countable number of expressions). The set of events definable 
in that language is therefore countable. Consequently, the union of all definable sets of 
measure 0 has measure 0, and we forbid a random sequence to belong to that union. 
The final version of the principle is as follows. 
4.1. The principle of typicalness. If a sequence is random then it does not belong to 
any dejnable set of measure 0. (Cf. [12].) 
The mathematical meaning of this principle is that it can serve to check if proposed 
definitions of randomness are adequate. In every particular case we have only to specify 
which sets are definable, that is to specify all accepted ways of defining a set. For 
example, for the concept of stochasticness we accept that a set (of infinite binary 
sequences) is dejnable if it consists of all sequences non-stochastic with respect to a 
computable rule of choice (in this case any definable set has measure 0). Thus, the 
notion of stochasticness - as a possible refinement of the concept of randomness -. 
satisfies the principle of typicalness (due to Theorem 3.16). 
4.2. The majority principle. Almost all (relative to measure which the considered 
version of notion of randomness is based on) sequences are random. In other words. 
the measure of the set of all random sequences is equal to 1. 
As it is stated in Corollary 3.17, the notion of stochasticness as a possible refinement 
of the concept of randomness satisfies the majority principle. As we have seen in 
Section 2, the notion of lawlessness does not satisfy this principle. 
5. Relations between different measures. The principle of distinguishing 
An interesting difference between category and measure is that category is uniquely 
specified by topology of space, whereas the measure p(s) = ~~(52,) of intervals Sz,, s E Z. 
can be defined in arbitrary way, the only restriction is the equality p(s) = p(s^O) + 
p(s^ 1) (where s-i is the extension of s with term i). Quite natural question is: does 
the notion of typicalness depend on the chosen measure? A possible application of the 
research in this direction is the identification of an unknown probability distribution by 
means of tests: the distribution must be such one that the sequence of results of a test 
is random relative to it. 
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Let us call two measures mutually singular, or inconsistent, if there is a set X C Q 
having measure 0 (i.e. is very small) relative to first measure and having measure 1 
(i.e. is very large) relative to second measure. We do not require that if the considered 
measures are definable in a reasonable sense (for example, are computable) then there 
is a definable set proving their inconsistency. But it turns out that for different refine- 
ments of the notion “definability” the inconsistency can always be proved by means 
of definable sets. For example, if two mutually singular measures are computable, then 
the constructive supports of those measures are disjoint [13, Section 351. 
Measures that are inconsistent with the uniform measure can be obtained by means 
of independent tosses of asymmetrical coins. Let p,, = 0.5 + d,, be the probability of 1 
in nth tossing 
Definition 3.3 
tuple s and rk 
is equal to 0. 
“the sequence 
Clearly, the 
for all n. 
(Id,1 GO.5). We obtain the generalized Bernoulli measure according to 
as follows: p(Q)=/~(s)= nlGkSn rk, where n stands for the length of 
is equal to pk if kth term of s is equal to 1 and to (1 - Pk) if that term 
The measure of an interval & is equal to the probability of the event 
obtained by tossing of coins belongs to !&‘,“. 
uniform measure r] can be also defined in that way: let us take p,, = 0.5 
Theorem 5.1 (Kakutani [4]). Let a generalized Bernoulli measure p has parameter 
P= (Pl,P2,..‘Pn, . . .), where p,, = 0.5 + d,, and the series Cd,’ diverges. Then the 
measure p and the uniform measure q are inconsistent. 
Proof. For every real E > 0 we will construct a set X =X(E) such that q(X) <a and 
p(X)> 1 - E. If this is done, then the set 
r=n u X(2-m) 
n man 
will have q-measure 0 and p-measure 1. 
To this end let us consider an auxiliary measure ~2 defined in the same way as p 
is; namely, we take d: = d,,/2 for p’. As 
we have 
,u-l’(.g2 >q(s)p(s) fi 
n=l ( 1 
1 + 2 
for every interval 52,, where k = lb(s). 
Let us fix a natural M > am2. As the series C d,” diverges we can find N such that for 
any tuple s E IN (where ZN is the set of all binary N-tuples) it holds P’(s)~ > p(s)~Z(s)M. 
Let us denote by S the set of all s EZ~ such that ,u(s)>~(s). We will prove that the 
set X = UsES Sz, can be taken as X(E). 
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First, if s E S then p’(s)’ ammo which involves p’(s) >, my(s) and therefore 
1 >, c P’(S) >, fix V(S). 
YES SES 
The last inequality implies 
i&Y)= c g(s)<MP%L 
CES 
Second, ifs @S then ~(s)>,u(s) and in the same way we get p’(s) 3 v%p(s). therefore 
1 3 c p’(s) 3 fix p(s), P(Q\m<& 
.S#S s&T 
and, finally, we get p(X) > 1 - c. 0 
In a sense two inconsistent measures are like the measure and the category (there is 
a set of first category having measure 1). Therefore keeping in mind the inconsistency 
of the notions of lawlessness and typicalness (even if typicalness is restricted to the 
law of large numbers), we can state one more principle: 
5.2. Principle sf distinguishing. No sequence is random relative to two inconsistent 
measures. 
Theorem 5.3. Stochasticness as randomness does not satisfy the principle of distin- 
guishing. That is, there are two inconsistent measures and a sequence such that the 
sequence is stochastic with respect to both measures. 
The proof is based on an easy observation that is stated in the following proposition. 
Proposition 5.4. For an arbitrary quasiuniform measure p, stochasticness relative to 
p is equivalent to stochasticness relative to the uniform measure 11. 
Proof. The notations pm and p(m) was explained in Definitions 3.8 and 3.12 (so pm = 
p(m)). Since pm + 0.5 as m ---f 30, hence [p(ml) + . . + p(mk)]/k ---t 0.5 as k + x for 
distinct i%l,...,mk. q 
Now, to prove Theorem 5.3 it is sufficient to take any quasi-uniform measure ,LL 
satisfying conditions of Kakutani’s theorem. 
So, the second main requirement to a refinement of the notion of randomness - the 
principle of distinguishing - is not satisfied for the notion of stochasticness. Therefore, 
in the following sections we will look for more adequate approach. 
We conclude this section with two methodological remarks. 
Remark 1. Theorem 5.3 can be proved without giving an exact definition of stochastic- 
ness relative to the measures implied in the formulation of that theorem. It is significant 
only to suppose that the definition satisfies the majority principle. For any measure p 
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let us denote by S, the set of sequences stochastic relative to p. It suffices now to 
prove the existence of a measure p satisfying two following conditions: 
(1) p is inconsistent with 9; 
(2) NV)= 1. 
Then, by majority principle we have p(S,) = 1. Therefore the intersection S, n S, 
is non-empty, and any sequence from this intersection contradicts the principle of 
distinguishing. 
Remark 2. Although we reject stochasticness as a de$nition of randomness, stochas- 
ticness remains to be one of the most important applications of randomness. We would 
remind the following words of Kolmogorov [5]: “the basis for the applicability of the 
results of the mathematical theory of probability to real ‘random phenomena’ must 
depend on some form of the jiequency concept of probability, the unavoidable nature 
of which has been established by von Mises in a spirited manner”. 
6. Games with finite and infinite sequences 
Intuitively speaking, a random sequence is an unpredictable sequence. All games of 
chance are based on the impossibility of prediction of results of such games. It is not 
surprising that probability theory arose in the middle of 18th century with observation 
of such games. In 20th century the nonexistence of winning strategy was taken by 
von Mises as the base of his approach to probability theory. He wrote: 
“This impossibility of affecting the chances of a game by a system of selection, this 
uselessness of all systems of gambling, is the characteristic and decisive property com- 
mon to all sequences of observations or mass phenomena which form the proper subject 
of probability calculus. (. . .) Everybody who has been to Monte Carlo, or who has read 
descriptions of a gambling bank, knows how many ‘absolutely safe’ gambling systems, 
sometimes of an enormously complicated character, have been invented and tried out 
by gamblers; and new systems are still being suggested every day. The authors of such 
systems have all, sooner or later, had the sad experience of finding out that no system 
is able to improve their chances of winning in the long run, i.e., to affect the relative 
frequencies with which different colours or numbers appear in a sequence selected from 
the total sequence of the game. This experience forms the total basis of our definition 
of probability”. ([ 151, the English translation is taken from [ 16, pp. 24-251). 
Therefore our next trial to formalize the notion of random sequence will be related 
with the notion of a game. Two players take part in the game - Man and (infinite 
binary) Sequence. Man tries to guess the values of some terms of Sequence. If he fails 
then he pays and if he is successful then he gets a prize. Our intuition tells us that 
a very random Sequence cannot be beaten. Of course we have given a rather vague 
idea. The notion of a game must be and will be described rigorously. 
Let us begin, however, with the description of games in which Man plays with a 
finite sequence. Finite games will clarify main ideas of the game approach to definition 
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of randomness. In addition, some of obtained facts will be used in the study of infinite 
sequences. 
6.1. Let us fix a number m and a measure cp on the set I” of all binary m-tuples, 
or finite binary sequences of length m. We suppose that all values of measure cp are 
positive rational numbers and that cp(l”) := 1. To define such a measure we have to 
define its value on all one-element sets, i.e. to define a function from I” into Q. Such a 
function can be represented as a finite table consisting of constructive objects, therefore 
it is, in its turn, a constructive object; consequently such a function can be an input 
and a result of an algorithm (computable function); this fact will be used in the sequel. 
The measure of a set can be considered as the probability of getting into this set. 
Thus, in the definition of a game there are two parameters: the length of tuple m 
and measure cp on I”. Such a game is called mjinite q-game. 
We will consider two versions of game: “For cash” and “On credit”. The rules of 
game consist of two parts. The first part is common for both versions, the second one 
is specific. 
The common rules are as follows. Let a = (al, ~2,. . . , a,;) be a fixed binary m-tuple. 
The player Man does not know this m-tuple. At the beginning of the game Man has 
an initial capital Vo, which is a nonnegative rational number. Man makes consecutive 
moves with numbers from 1 to m. Before kth move Man possesses the capital Vk_, , 
where k=l,..., m. The move with number k is a pair: a predicted vulue i(k) E (0, 1 } 
and a bet u(k) E Q, v(k) 20. After kth move Man finds out true value of ak. If i(k) # a~ 
(i.e. Man’s guess is not correct) Man loses the bet and his capital is decreased by the 
bet: V, = Vk-1 - v(k). If i(k)=uk (i.e. Man’s guess is correct) then his capital is 
increased by the value of the bet multiplied by a coefficient. This coefficient is defined 
as follows. Let us denote by ZYm the set of all m-tuples extending the tuple s. Let us 
introduce two k-tuples u=(ut,...,uk_1,1-i(k)) and w=(u~,...,u~_~,i(k)). Then (if 
i(k ) = ax ) 
Man’s goal is to increase his capital. Therefore, we are interested in the value of$na/ 
capital V,. 
While playing Man can use a strategy, i.e. some instructions how to act in different 
situations. More precisely, we usually call a strategy any mapping from the set of 
all possible positions into the set of all legal moves. As to the term “position”, this 
is the common term for the formal representation of information known to Man. In 
our case we could call the position before the kth move the tuple (at,. . . , uk_ 1, Vk_ I). 
However, we can easily prove (by induction on k) that if we are given a strategy rr in 
the sense above then in any game for every fixed VO, al,. . . , ‘z-1 we will use the value 
CJ( (al,. . , ak-_l, Vk- 1)) only for one value of vk_ 1 and this value can be computed 
given Vo, al,. , ak-_l. Therefore we will call a strategy any mapping from the set of 
tuples of the form (al,. . . , a,&_l), k<m (including the empty tuple) into the set of 
moves, i.e. the set of pairs (i(k),v(k)). If the current move ordered by the strategy is 
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not legal (below we will give the restrictions of value of bet) then the game is over 
and final capital is equal to the current one. 
Now we will describe two versions of the game. Both versions are specified with 
restrictions of value of bet. In the game “For cash” the restriction is that v(k) d vk_ 1, 
thus in this game the inequality vk 3 0 always holds. In the game “On credit” the 
restriction is that v(k) 6 1; thus Man’s capital can become negative. 
We can easily see that in both versions given a strategy and an initial capital Vo 
we can decide effectively whether the strategy makes only legal moves. We will call 
strategies satisfying this requirement correct (for given VO). 
Remark. Informally speaking, the game “On credit” is similar to the logarithm of the 
game “For cash”. If in a m-finite q-game the measure cp of every tuple is equal to 
2-“, then in the game “For cash” the capital after one move can increase at most 
twice. In the game “On credit” after one move the capital can increase at most by the 
additive constant 1. In the game “For cash” it is natural to be interested in the value of 
the ratio V,/Vo and in the game “On credit” - in the value of the dt@rence V, - V,. 
And so on. There is also a logarithmic analogy in the two following theorems. 
In the case of finite games (i.e. games with finite sequences) the statements of 
theorems become easier if we restrict ourselves with normalized games, i.e. games 
with normalized initial capital. In the game “For cash” the normalized initial capital 
is equal to one, in the game “On credit” the normalized initial capital is equal to 
zero. However, in the sequel in the study of infinite games (i.e. games with infinite 
sequences) we will use non-normalized games. The reason is that sometimes it is 
convenient to divide an infinite game into infinite succession of phases, each of them 
is a finite game. In those finite games initial capital may be non-normalized: it will 
be equal to the capital in infinite game possessed by Man at the beginning of the 
phase. All theorems on normalized games can be easily restated for non-normalized 
games. 
It is natural to expect that Man can increase his initial capital if he possesses some 
information about the sequence which he plays against. The following theorems state 
this assertion in more precise form. 
Theorem 6.1.1. On the game “For cash” (An.A. Muchnik). 
1. Let a measure cp on I” and a set S&I” be given. Then there is a strategy in 
the normalized m-finite q-game “For cash” such that for every finite sequence a E S 
the strategy guarantees that V,>(cp(S))-’ in the game against a. 
2. The above mentioned strategy can be effectively found given m, CJJ and S. That is, 
there is a computable function f of 4 arguments m, cp, S and x (where x = (xl,. . . , xk) 
is the tuple consisting of known terms of sequence) such that for all m, cp, and S the 
function Ax.f(m,q,S,x) is a strategy satisfying the requirements of item 1. 
3. The bound from item 1 cannot be improved in the following sense: 
Yrn Ycp W # @i Y’a 3a E S [in the normalized m-finite q-game “For cash”, tf Man plays 
according to the strategy o against a then V, <(q(S))-‘I. 
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Theorem 6.1.2. On the game “On credit” (An.A. Muchnik). 
1. Let u meusure cp on P, u subset SC Im and u rationul number r<-ln((p(S)) 
be given. Then there is LE strategy which .fbr everql jinite sequence a ES yuurantws 
the inrquulity V,,, >r in the normalized myfinite (p-gunw “On credit” ugainst u. 
2. The stratr~qy oj’item 1 cun be t$&~tively,ftilmd qicen m, q,S und r. Thut is, there 
is N computuhle Junction f‘ oj’ 5 urguments m. q, S. r und x .such thut Mm /fcp YS tit” ix..f’ 
(m, q,S,r,x) is a strategy satisjiviny the requirements of’ item 1. 
3. The bound,fiom item 1 cannot be improved in thefi~llo~ving sense. Let rationuls p 
und r be,fixed und let 0 <p d 1, r > -In(p). Then grno v’nz >m() 3~p YUE I”‘[(cp({a}) < ,):I 
& ‘ia [in the normalized m-jinite cp-~~unze “On credit” uyainst u, lf’ A4irn plu~\~.\ 
according to the strcrtegy CJ then V, <r]]. 
Let us call the unijixm measure on I”’ the measure cp defined by equality (p( { u} ) = 
2F” for every a E I”‘. 
Theorem 6.1.3. On the game “On credit” for the uniform measure (An.A. Muchnik). 
1. Let u subset S C I”’ und a rationtrl r < -lb(cp(S)) be given, ,~hcre cp is the, 
unij’orm meu.sure and lb is logarithm to the base 2. Then there is u strtrtecgy in the 
normulted mYfinite q-game “On credit” such that if’ Mun pluys according to this 
struteqy uguinst uny sequence a E S then the inequality V,,, > r holds. 
2. The strategy of item 1 can be gjfectively ,fimnd given m,S and Y. 
3. The bounrl,from item 1 cannot be improved in the ,follo\ving sense: vn Ym > n vs 
(/sl = n)v’a ja E I: [if’ in the normulizd mYfinite cp-ycrme “On credit” Man pluy,c 
uguinst a according to the strategy CJ then V,, < - Ib(y(I,!‘)) = n]. 
Remark 6.1.4. The three last theorems can be generalized to non-normalized games. In 
the first theorem we have to replace V,, with the ratio V,,JVo, in the last two theorems 
we have to replace V, with the difference V, ~ Vu. The statements on non-normalized 
games are trivial consequences of the corresponding statements on normalized games 
Some remarks on the proofs: 
1. In this paper we will prove only the first items of Theorems 6.1 .I and 6. I .3. 
These proofs will be used in basic Theorems 9.1 and 9.2. 
2. The second items of all theorems follow from the effectiveness of the proofs OF 
the first items. 
Now we are going to prove the first item of theorem on the game “For cash”. Let 
us prove first the following lemma. 
Lemma 6.1.5. Let cp be a measure on I” and let V be N nonneyutivr ,fimc.tion ,fiom 
I <“’ (1 <“I stands ,for the set of ull k-tuples with k <m) into Q such thut V(A) = I 
unrl,for any tuple s if /s1 <m then the ,follosimq holds: 
V(s)y(s)= V(.s~O)y(s~O)+ V(s^l)cp(s^l) (*) 
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(here q(s) denotes cp(ZF), and ZF is the set of all tuples from Im that extend s). Then 
there is a correct strategy a in the normalized m-finite q-game “For cash” such that 
for any k-tuple s with k 6 m tf Man plays according to o against s then his capital 
after k moves is equal to V(s). 
Proof. Let us describe the strategy 0. Assume that in position s (JsI = k - 1) the cur- 
rent capital is equal to V(s). Man has to predict the kth term. To this end Man 
determines the least of two numbers V(s^i), i E (0, 1) (if they are equal then Man 
chooses any of them); without loss of generality we can assume that this number is 
V(s *l). Then V(s -1) < V(s) (this follows from (*), as cp is a measure). Man bets the 
capital v = V(s) - V(s^l) on 0. Then after this move the capital in the game against 
s * 1 will be equal to V(s) - v = V(s ^  1) and in the game against s -0 it will be equal to 
which is equal to V(s^O) because of (*). 0 
6.1.6. Proof of item 1 of Theorem 6.1 .l. Let us put V(s) = (q(S))-’ if s E S and 
Y(s) = 0 if s E P\S. Then CsEIm V(s)qo(s) = 1. Further, let us define 
V(t>=(cp(t))_‘[V(t^O)cp(t^O)+ V(t^l)cp(t”l)] 
for ItI <m (here we use induction on m - It/). By induction we can prove that for all 
1 <m, the equality CsEI, V(s)cp(s) = 1 holds. In particular, for 1= 0 when I’ consists 
of the single empty sequence A, we get V(A) = 1 as cp(n) = 1. 
On the other hand, function V satisfies the equality (*) from Lemma 6.15. Applying 
Lemma 6.1.5 we get the desired strategy. 0 
Remark 6.1.7. In the sequel we will consider finite games “For cash” - the fragments 
of infinite games - in which the measure of I” is not equal to 1. Let the measure 
of Im be equal to qpo < 1. Similarly to the proof of item 1 of Theorem 6.1.1 we can 
easily show (this is left to the reader) that in this case we can guarantee the inequality 
V, >(cp(S))-‘cpo - in the conditions of item 1 of Theorem 6.1.1. 
6.1.8. Proof of item 1 of Theorem 6.1.3. Let us consider function f defined on I<” 
by equality f(t) = lb(cp(S n Zy)/cp(l;“)) - lb(cp(S)). (If S n1;” = 0, then f(t) = -00). 
Now we can define a strategy, which we are looking for. If f(t^0) >f(t) then the strat- 
egy predicts zero as value of (1 t 1 + 1 )th term, and the bet is equal to f(t ^O) - f(t). 
If f(t I1 ) 3 f(t) then the strategy predicts one as value of ( ItI + 1 )th term, and the 
bet is equal to f(t^1) - f(t). It is clear that f(/l) = 0 and largest increase of cur- 
rent capital after one move is 1. For the strategy just described, we claim that for 
every tEIGm the current capital is not less than f(t). It is sufficient to prove that 
Vt f(t) 2 (f (t ^ O) + f (t n 1))/2. Due to the definition of function f, the last inequality is 
deduced from the next one: vQ < (x + y)/2, where x = cp(S npo) and y = &S n IF, ). 
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Our strategy does not satisfy the requirement of rationality of bets. To correct this 
defect, we can define a new strategy whose bets will be rational but very close to the 
corresponding bets of previous strategy. If t E S, then ,f(t) = -lb(cp{S)). So the new 
strategy has capital V, >r when t E 5’. Ll 
6.2. Let us turn now to infinite games, i.e. games in which the active player - Man ~ 
plays against an infinite sequence a E !2. Additional parameters are a fixed quasimea- 
sure p on E (below we will usually assume that p is computable) and a positive 
rational which is Man’s initial capital. According to 3.3.4, that quasimeasure induces 
the corresponding probabilistic measure, or probability distribution, p on Q. 
The game, called p-game (or simply game, if it is clear what a measure is consid- 
ered), runs as follows. Man predicts values (unknown to him) of some terms a, of the 
sequence a and bets on predicted value a capital not greater than his current capital 
(so the game is “For cash”). If Man fails then Man’s capital is decreased by the value 
of his bet and if he is successful then his capital increases by a value depending on 
his bet and on the a priori probability of the predicted event, that probability being 
determined making use of p. Man’s prediction is based on the true values of already 
predicted (correctly or incorrectly) terms ~~ it is the only information that Man gets, and 
Man’s goal is not to increase the number of correct predictions, his goal is to increase 
his capital. The game is for cash therefore every bet cannot exceed the current capital. 
There are three distinctions from above considered game “For cash”: first, Man plays 
against infinite sequence; second, the predicted terms may be chosen in any order (not 
only in succession); third, the current move can be undefined. 
More precisely, the kth (k = 1,2,3,. . . j moue in p-game consists in the following. 
Man chooses a number n = n(k) of the term a, being predicted, its predictrd txhcr 
i = i(k) E (0, l}, and a bet o = v(k), which is a nonnegative rational not greater than 
the value V,_-t of Man’s capital before lath move. (Let us recall that I$ is the initial 
capital.) Necessary requirement: n(k) cannot coincide with any n(l), 1 <k, i.e. repeating 
predictions are impossible. Thus, every move is a triple of numbers (n, i, c). 
Man’s capital Vk after the kth move is defined as follows. If Man’s guess is incorrect, 
i.e. a, fi, then Vk = Vk-1 - v(k) (the bet is lost). 
Let us assume that Man’s guess is correct, i.e. a,(k) = i(k). We define 
A=A(k- l)L{a’~52:a~(,,=rr,(,) for I= 1,2....,k- I}, 
Ai=/lj(k)={a’FA:a:(,,=i} for i=O,l. 
Then 
h = Vk-I + U(k)~(Al-i(k))l~L(Ai,k)). 
This definition is due to the requirement of “fairness” of p-game: the mathematical 
expectation of gain (= change of capital) in one move must be equal to zero. We will 
explain later what to do if p(Aj(k)) = 0. 
After computing vk Man either makes the (k + 1 )th move, or refuses to do the 
(k + 1 )th move. If Man never refuses to make current move then the game lasts 
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infinitely long. If Man refuses to make the kth move then the game stops and all 
values n(Z), i(l), v(Z) with I >k are undefined. In this case I$ = Vk-1 for all 1 >k. 
Now we are going to discuss the case /,L(Ai(k)) = 0. Of course it may not happen 
if p =q, where q is the uniform measure. But generally speaking it is possible. If 
we do not want to impose certain restrictions on the measure p we must add two 
complementary rules to the list of game rules: 
Complementary Rule 1. If p(A(k)) = 0 then the game stops after the kth move. Since 
,n(sZ)= 1, the first move can be made in every game. As Ao(k)UAl(k)=A(k - l), the 
rule secures that if the kth move is made then at least one of the sets Ao(k) and Al(k) 
has positive measure. So the (k + 1)th move can be made in the case &4(k)) # 0. 
Complementary Rule 2. Suppose that the kth prediction is correct (i.e. a@) =i(k)) 
and p(Aj(k)) = 0. Then Man’s gain is declared to be equal to plus infinity. In this case 
the game stops after the kth move and we define I$ = foe. 
The consequences of stopping the game by reason of zero measure are the same as 
those of Man’s refusal to make the move next in turn. 
Thus, for any game the function vj (as a function of k) is defined on the whole 
set N of natural numbers, whereas the functions n(k),i(k) and v(k) are defined on an 
initial segment of N (that segment may coincide with N). 
Definition 6.2.1. The result of p-game: we define that Man wins if supk V, = +CXZ (Of 
course, if it occurs that I$ = fee for some k then Man wins.) 
This definition has a reasonable sense. Assume that sequence a is the sequence of 
moves of the second player - let us call him Casino - who has also an initial capital 
(unknown to Man as well as the sequence a is); and all pay-offs to Man are paid 
from the capital of Casino, and vice versa every loss of Man is added to the capital 
of Casino. Then the final win of Man means that Casino is brought to ruin, however 
large its initial capital is. 
As well as in the case of finite games, it is convenient to use the notion of strategy 
in an infinite game. As we know, a strategy is a way of playing, i.e. an instruction 
which determines the current move of player given current position. However, because 
of the same reason as in the case of finite games, it is natural to include in the domain 
of strategy not all information known to Man (the numbers and values of known terms 
of the sequence, the order in which they were predicted, the current capital) but only 
the tuple of known values in the order in which they were predicted. 
Definitions 6.2.1.1. A strategy is a mapping from the set of all tuples of the form 
(a1,uz,..., &__l), k = 1,2,3,4,. . ; CII = 0,l (the meaning is: al = a,(l)) into the set of 
moves, i.e. into the set of triples (n, i, V) E N x (0, l} x Q (the meaning is: n = n(k), i = 
i(k), v= v(k) - see the above description of kth move). If this mapping is com- 
putable then we call the strategy computable. A winning strategy is a strategy such 
that if Man with the initial capital Vo = 1 plays according to the strategy then he 
wins. 
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Remark 1. We do not suppose a strategy to be totully de$ned and correct. This means 
that it may happen that Man cannot make the kth move, next in turn, according to 
the strategy because it is undefined or is not legal. In this case Man refuses to make 
a move, and as we have said, the values n(k), i(k) and t:(k) are considered to be 
undefined and the capital does not change: If-1 = Vk = Vk + 1 = Vk ,2 = It is clear 
that in such a game Man loses (provided that VA_, # +‘x). 
Remark 2. We do not require every term uk of sequence a to be ever predicted (cor- 
rectly or not). 
Remark 3. The order of predictions, as well as predicted values and bets, depends in 
general case not only on measure p but also on the sequence which Man plays against. 
To emphasize this dependence we will (when necessary) write n(a,k), i(a,k), &(a), 
c(a,lC) instead of n(k), i(k), 6, r(k). This notation has exact meaning if ,u, I$ and a 
strategy are given. 
Definition 6.2.1.2. Let a quasimeasure ~1, an initial capital V, and a strategy rr be fixed. 
For any finite sequence s = (si, . ,snl) t E let us define the set 
A,,={acR: u~(~,~)=sI for all l=l,&...,m) 
In particular, A,, = s2 (recall that A denotes the empty sequence). We can easily see 
that if a, b E A,? then V,(a) = V,(b). We denote by V(s) the value of the function I$. 
where m = lb(s), on any a E A, (if A, is empty then V(s) is undefined). 
We will say that a finite set S c E yiurs a partition if 
(i) UcES QY = Q; 
(ii) for all different p,q from S the intervals Q, and R, are disjoint; and 
(iii) for all s ES, p(A,?) # 0. 
The following proposition gives a global consequence of the (local) property from 
the rule of p-game stating that the mathematical expectation of gain for one move is 
equal to zero. 
Proposition 6.2.2. Let a set S give u purtition. Then the equality CstS ,u(A,)V(s) = 
I$ holds. 
Proof. We will prove the equality by induction on the sum H of the lengths of all 
elements s E S. If n = 0 then the equality is obvious. Let the equality holds for all 
n cm = C,,s lb(p). Let s ES be one of the longest tuple from S. We denote k = Ih(s). 
Let, for the sake of definitiveness, s = u-1. From the definition of s and the properties 
of S we can easily deduce that s’ = u-0 also belongs to S. Evidently (S \ {s,s’}) U {u} 
is partition and it is sufficient to prove 
V(sh4A.s 1 + V(h44 > = V(uh-44,). (*) 
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For the sake of definitiveness, let us assume that i(a, k) = 0 for some (hence for 
every) sequence a E A,. Then by definition, 
V(u*1) = V(U) - v (where v = v(a,k)), 
Vu’-O) = v(u) + vAA,-, )/AA,-,), 
and the equality (*) becomes obvious. 0 
The function of capital has some additional properties in the case of continuous 
strategies. Since this place we will suppose that the initial capital 6 is equal to 1. 
Definition 6.2.3. Let us call a strategy 0 continuous for p-game if it is totally defined, 
correct and, playing p-game against any sequence a = (~1, ~2,. . .), for every k it predicts 
on kth move the value of kth term ak. 
If a strategy cs is continuous then in the game according to cr against any finite 
sequence s E E of length kl Man makes exactly k moves; this game coincides with 
above considered finite game “For cash”. We denote by V(s) = P(s) the final Man’s 
capital in the game against s (i.e. after k moves); it is clear that V(A) = 1. It is also 
clear that V”(s) = &(a) for any infinite sequence a extending s. The function V’(s) 
will be called capital function (attached to the strategy o). 
Proposition 6.2.4. For any u-game a continuous trategy CJ and the capital function 
V” attached to IT either both are computable, or both are uncomputable. 
Proof. Obvious as in every p-game not only 0 determines the function Vu, but also, 
in the case of continuous strategies, V” uniquely determines cr. (Let us remind our 
assumptions of computability of the quasimeasure p.) 0 
Proposition 6.2.5. For a fixed measure p: a function V from 2 into the set of nonneg- 
ative rationals is the capital function in u-game attached to some continuous trategy 
ifs the product V(s)u(s) is a quasimeasure. (Recall that u(s) = ,u(sZ,)). 
Proof. Let V be a capital function and lb(s) = k - 1. In position s Man predicts the 
value of kth term. Without loss of generality we may assume that Man bets some 
capital v on the value ak = 0 (the case of the bet on ak = 1 is entirely symmetrical). 
Then 
V(s^l) = V(s) - v, V(s^O) = V(s) + v#U(s^ 1 )/&^O), 
which involves V(s)u(s) = V(s*O)u(s*O) + V(s^l)p(s^l), i.e. V(s)u(s) is a quasimea- 
sure. The converse assertion in fact was proved in Lemma 6.1.5. 0 
Now we will give a generalization of the notion of continuous strategy - the notion 
of monotone strategy. 
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Definition 6.2.6. A strategy (not necessary totally defined) is called monotone if in 
the game according to it the numbers of predicted terms increase (i.e. n(k + l)>n(k)). 
The requirement of monotony is weaker than the requirement of continuity; how- 
ever the possibilities of Man are enlarged rather slightly; the following proposition 
formalizes the meaning of this remark. 
Proposition 6.2.7. IJ’ Man has a totally de$ned und correct monotone computable 
\rinning strategy then he has also a continuous computable winning strategJ1. 
Proof. Man has to predict all terms between n(k) and n(k + 1) betting zero on arbitrary 
value. 0 
As we will show below, the requirement of monotony restricts very much the power 
of strategies (see Theorems 9.1 and 9.5). Continuous strategies play a very important 
role in our analysis. In particular, the action of some non-continuous strategies will 
consist of continuous phases, i.e. of finite games (we have already told about this 
point). This can be illustrated by the proofs of Theorems 9.1 and 9.2; in those proofs 
the row N of natural numbers is partitioned into zones, and for every zone there is 
corresponding continuous strategy which acts within that zone. 
7. Predictable and unpredictable sequences 
Now we turn to the keynote definition directed towards the use of games for math- 
ematical analysis of the notion of randomness. The idea is as follows: if Man has 
enough information about terms of an infinite sequence to win in the game against this 
sequence is not random. 
Definition 7.1. If CJ is a winning strategy in p-game against a sequence a then a is 
called p-predictable via (T. A sequence a is called p-predictable if there is a com- 
putable winning strategy in p-game against a; in other case the sequence is called 
p-unpredictable. Let us recall that we suppose the initial capital V, to be equal to 1: 
this requirement is included into Definition 6.2.1 .l. However, it is evident that if a is 
p-predictable then for every rational &I > 0 there is a winning (in a naturally generalized 
sense) strategy in p-game against a with initial capital &I,. 
Let us look if the notion of p-unpredictable, as “model” of the notion of randomness. 
satisfies two criteria stated in Sections 4 and 5. 
Theorem 7.2 (theorem of typicalness). The set of all injinitr seyuences a thut are 
p-predictable via a strategy CJ has p-measure 0. 
This theorem, which is evidently similar to Theorem 3.16 (and even stronger than 
Theorem 3.16, as we will see in the proof of Theorem 7.4), will be deduced in the next 
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section (see 8.10) from another theorem of the same kind, namely, from relativized 
versions of Theorems 8.7 and 8.9. 
Corollary 7.3 (majority theorem). The set of all p-unpredictable sequences has 
p-measure 1. 
Before studying the question whether the notion of unpredictability satisfies our 
second main principle - the principle of distinguishing - we will consider relations 
between unpredictability and our previous notion - stochasticness. 
Theorem 7.4. All q-unpredictable sequences are rl-stochastic. (Recall that y denotes 
the uniform measure.) 
(This theorem can be proved also for other measures, however we will not expose 
the proof here.) 
Proof. Let us assume that a sequence a is not q-stochastic, i.e. there is a computable 
rule which chooses from a a subsequence b not satisfying the law of large numbers. 
Without loss of generality we may assume that in b there occur ones more than zeros; 
more precisely, there is a rational p = 0.5 + 6 > 0.5 such that there are infinitely many 
m such that there are at least pm ones among m first terms of b. 
The winning strategy in q-game against a is as follows. 
First, the predicted terms are chosen in the same order as the computable rule of 
choice proving nonstochasticness of a does. 
Second, if this rule does not include a current term in the subsequence b then Man 
bets zero on this term. 
Third, if a current term is included in the subsequence b then Man bets V6 on 1, 
where V is his current capital. 
According to our agreement the initial Man’s capital 6 is equal to 1. And it is clear 
that after choosing IZ terms of the sequence b the current Man’s capital is equal to 
y, = (1 + C?)n’( 1 - C?>n, = [( 1 + 6)“‘“‘( 1 - @--a(n) 
where IZ~ and no are the numbers of ones and zeros, respectively, among n first terms 
of sequence b, cc(n) = nl/n. Thus, if n is such that nr 3np then 
v, 3 [( 1 + 6)0.5+6( 1 - C3)0.s-6]Y 
But ( 1 + a)‘.‘+‘( 1 - ~3)~.~-’ > 1 for 0 < 6 < 0.5 (this fact can be easily verified by means 
of taking logarithm of the function 2~. (1 + x)0.5+8( 1 - ~~~~~~~ and analyzing the 
derivative). Hence, as the inequality nr >np holds for infinitely many n and 6 does 
not depend on n, the function V, is unbounded. 0 
Thus, all unpredictable sequences are stochastic. The strategy constructed in 
Theorem 7.4 depends on the rational p and on that element from (0, 1) for which 
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the amount of its occurences in many beginnings of the sequence is greater than the 
amount of the other element’s occurences. But we can prove the following fact: .fbr 
every place selection rule, there is a strategy (computable if’ the rule is computabIe) 
such that any sequence which is non-stochastic via this rule is predictable viu this 
strategy. 
Now we want to prove that the class of stochastic sequences is strictly greater than 
the class of unpredictable sequences. This result will be proved not by presenting an 
example of stochastic predictable sequence (as it is usually done in similar cases), but 
in another way. 
At first we will prove: 
Theorem 7.5 (theorem of distinguishing). If measures u and i are computable and 
inconsistent then no sequence is u-unpredictable and R-unpredictable simultaneously. 
Corollary 7.5.1. Zf measures ,U and A are computable and inconsistent then the set 
oj’ all A-unpredictable sequences has u-measure 0. 
To prove the corollary we have to recall Corollary 7.3. 
Proof of Theorem 7.5. The following lemma is true. 
Lemma 7.5.2. For every E>O there are a natural k = k(E) and two sets S(E), T(C) 
such that S(E) and T(E) are disjoint, their union equals to Ik, and &Y(E)) <(-:, j,( V(c)) 
CE. where 
X(F)= u an Y(E)= u cl,. 
SES(F) tGT(e) 
Proof. Because of inconsistency there is a set X 2 Q such that p(X) = 0 and i( Y) = 0. 
where Y = sZ\X. There are two open sets Gx, Gr C Sz covering X and Y, respectively. 
(therefore GX U Gr = 52) and such that ,u(Gx) <E, I(Gr) <E. As 52 is compact, there 
are a natural k and disjoint sets S(E), T(E) such that S(E) u T(E) = Zk and 
X(E)= U QsCGx, Y(E)= u S2,CGy. q 
SES(E) Tut 
Let us return to the proof of Theorem 7.5. Note that because of computability of 
the measures, given a rational e>O we can compute by exhaustion a number k(E) and 
sets S(E), T(E) & ZkcE) satisfying conditions from the lemma. 
Let us construct by induction an increasing sequence of natural d( I), d(2), d( 3), . . 
such that d( 1) = 0, and for every m: if 
6, = min{p(Q), A(&): sEZd(m),P(Rs)>O, I(Q,)>O}, E, = 6,2-2m-1 
then d(m + 1) = k(&,) (k is defined in the lemma). 
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Let us denote by a an infinite sequence which Man plays against. We will construct 
two continuous trategies afl and a’. Man wins in p-game via ap or Man wins in 
i-game via a’. 
Let us divide the infinite game in the sequence of m-fragments. In the game on the 
mth zone Man predicts the values of terms of the sequence a with numbers d(m) + 
l,d(m)+2,. . . ,d(m+ 1). There are two strategies a: and ai with symmetrical qualities 
(1) and (2): 
(1) if a 6X(&,) then at increases the captial I&) at least 2*“’ times and ai de- 
creases V&m) at most twice during the game on the mth zone, 
(2) if a E Y(E,) then aA increases the captial &cm) at least 22m times and ai de- 
creases Vd(m) at most twice during the game on the mth zone. 
(X, Y are defined in the lemma.) 
The strategy ai is obtained by application of Theorem 6.1 .I and Remarks 6.1.4, 6.1.7 
to the finite game on the mth zone. This game is against the sequence (a(d(m) + 
I), a(4m) + 2), . . , a(4m + 1 I)), with the measure q(s) = %(sa^s), where SO = (a( 1 ), 
a(2), . . . , a(d(m))), with the initial captial &cm)/2 and with the set S = {s: SO-S E T(E,)} 
(T(s) is defined in the lemma). The strategy ag is constructed analogously. The captial 
I&) cannot decrease more than twice, because only half of Qrn) “takes part” in the 
game on the mth zone. The “increasing” quality of a$,, ai takes place owing to the 
construction of d(m + 1). 
The strategy al is the union of the strategies ai (for 1 symmetrically). As VE > 0 
X(E) U Y(E) = Q, at least one of two sets 
fWP = {m: a EX(c,)}, MA = {m: a E Y(E,)} 
is infinite. If IMPI = cc then ai’ wins in p-game, if IMJ, = cc then a1 wins in A-game. 
Evidently the strategies ap, a’ are computable and monotone. 0 
Definition 7.6. A sequence is called monotonically p-predictable if there is a monotone 
computable winning strategy in the p-game against this sequence; if this is not the case 
then the sequence is called monotonically p-unpredictable. 
Remark 7.6.1 (on Definition 7.6). As we will see below (Corollary 9.5.1), in the gen- 
eral case q-predictability does not imply monotonic y-predictability. 
From the proof of Theorem 7.5 we obtain the following fact: 
Proposition 7.6.2. If two measures are computable and inconsistent hen every se- 
quence is monotonically predictable for one of these measures. 
Earlier (before Theorem 7.5) we intended to give an implicit construction of a 
stochastic predictable sequence. But now we can state even monotonic predictability 
of the sequence. 
A. A. Muchnik et al. I Thmretiul Conlputer Scienw 207 (1998) X3-~31 7 293 
Corollary 7.7 (from Theorem 7.5). There ure +~tochastic monotonicall~s typrrdict- 
able sequences. (Recall that q denotes the uniform measure.) 
Proof. There is a computable quasiuniform measure satisfying conditions of 
Theorem 5. I (it is sufficient to set d, = O.%Z-~~~ ); let us denote it by ,u. Due to Propo- 
sition 5.4 the set of all II-stochastic sequences coincides with the set of all /l-stochastic 
sequences and therefore it has p-measure 1 (due to Corollary 3.14). At the same time, 
the set of all monotonically g-unpredictable sequences has /c-measure 0 due to Corol- 
lary 75.1 reformulated for monotonic j_-unpredictability. (We can get this strengthening 
due to monotonicity of both strategies constructed in the proof of Theorem 7.5.) II? 
Definition 7.8. According to our general agreement (on omitting of the indication of 
uniformness of measure), an q-predictable (v-unpredictable) sequence will be called 
also simply predictable (unpredictable). 
In conclusion of this section we would state that Theorems 7.5 and 7.2 give hope 
that the notion of unpredictable sequence is rather adequate definition of the notion of 
randomness. However, there is another adequate definition, which we turn now to. 
8. Chaotic sequences 
We have to begin with some definitions important for algorithmic probability 
theory. 
Definition 8.1. A nonnegative function defined on 5 is called semimeasure on Z (or 
simply serni~r~easurr) if it is not greater than some quasimeasure on E (see Defini- 
tions 3.3.4). 
Our notion of semimeasure differs from the notion of semimeasure given in [2.23] 
(English translation [24]); however assertions on semimeasures in the sense of those 
papers are valid for semimeasures in our sense; they can be proved similarly. 
We are particularly interested in semimeasures satisfying the following definition. 
Definition 8.2. A semimeasure 1 is called recursiwly enumerohle fiiom helo~r (briefly, 
r.e.b.) if the set (“undergraph”) 
{(s,q) EZ x Cl: q-C;@)} 
is recursively enumerable (Q stands for the set of rational numbers). 
Why we have to consider only such semimeasures? We will interpret -lb(jl(.F)) 
(where lb(x) is the logarithm of x to the base 2) as the quantity of information which 
is required for the complete description of the object s. Once found, a description is 
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preserved; however, it is possible that later a shorter description will be found. Thus, 
-lb(y(s)) can be approximized from above and y(s) approximized from below. This 
is the source of the definition. 
On the family of all semimeasures the following quasiorder is defined: 
yi Gy2 means 3c Vs[yl(s> <cYz(s)]. 
Theorem 8.3 (Gacs, [2, Theorem 3.11, V’yugin [23, Theorem 4.11; cf. Zvonkin and 
Levin [30, Theorem 3.31). The family of all r.e.b. semimeasures has the greatest 
semimeasure with respect o above dejned quasiordering. 
Lemma 8.3.1. A nonnegative function 1 on Z is a semimeasure ifs (*) for every 
jinite set T c E”: if Vp, q E T QR, n Q, = 0 then C,,, A(t)< 1. 
Proof. For semimeasures, the condition (*) is evident. If, conversely, (*) holds then we 
define the function .D on S as follows. For s E B let R(s) = {T C !C&: Vp, q E T Sz, n R, 
=8}. Then ,u(s)= suprERCS) CtET A.(t). The sought quasimeasure U(S) is defined by 
induction on the length of s: M(A) = 1, a(s^O) = p(s^O), cl(s^1) = a(s) - p(s^O). The 
check of required properties is easy enough. 0 
Lemma 8.3.2. Given a r.e.b. nonnegative function A on 3, one can efictively con- 
struct a r. e. b. semimeasure 2’ such that kfsA’(s) d I(s), and if /1 is semimeasure itself 
then V&‘(s) = A(s). 
Proof. For every finite step of the enumeration of the undergraph of A, we have only 
finite subset of E on which the current values of A are positive. For that finite subset 
we can effectively check the condition (*). If it does not hold then we stop enumeration 
of A on the previous step. If (*) holds we go on. 0 
Let M be the set of all r.e.b. nonnegative functions on E. It is easy to see that 
M possesses a computable enumeration. That means that there exists a computable 
function f : N 4 M such that VA E M 3n E N f(n) = A. 
The function C,“=, 2?f’(n) will do as the greatest r.e.b. semimeasure on B (the 
operator f(n) H f’(n) is defined in Lemma 8.3.2). 0 
Let us fix one of the greatest (in this sense) semimeasures and denote it by 1/~. Thus 
the recursively enumerable from below semimeasure YA possesses the quality that for 
every r.e.b. semimeasure y there is a constant c satisfying the inequality y(s)<cyA(s) 
for all s. 
Definition 8.4. The semimeasure ?A is called the a priori semimeasure. The natural 
number U(s) = [-lb(yA(s)) + l] . 1s called the a priori entropy of finite sequence s 
(where [x] denotes the greatest integer less than or equal to x). 
One may consider KA(s) as a measure of complexity of a finite sequence s; one 
may interpret that measure, represented by natural number, as the amount of bits of 
information. The following question may arise: 
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will uny results change if we consider unother greatest semimeasure, say 7~; (evidently 
there are in$nitely many greatest semimeasures)? 
By definition, the semimeasure $, is equivalent to ?A, that is there is a positive 
constant c such that ~A(s)<cY~(s) and 72 (s)<c;‘A(s) for all s. In a sense a priori 
semimeasure is defined to within a multiplicative constant and a priori entropy is 
defined to within an additive constant. In any case all presented statements are invariant 
in the sense mentioned above. 
Now we are able to give the definition of chaoticness. Let a computable quasimeasure 
p on F be fixed. Let us define the p-complexity K = K,, of s by equality K(s) = 
[-lb(p(s))+ I]. It is clear that p is r.e.b. semimeasure and therefore KA(s)<K(s) + C 
for all s, where C is a constant not depending on s. 
Definition 8.5. An infinite sequence a is called ,u-chaotic if there is a constant C such 
that KA(aln)>K,(aln) - C for all n. Equivalently, pA(aln)dcp(aln) for some c. (Here 
aln stands for the tuple consisting of the first n terms of a.) A sequence which is not 
p-chaotic is called y-non-chaotic. 
Definition 8.6. Let us call y-chaotic sequences simply chaotic. 
Recall that q(s) =2- Ih(‘) is the uniform measure. Thus, a sequence a is chaotic iff 
there is a constant C such that KA(a/n)>n - C for all n. 
So for a p-chaotic sequence the a priori entropy of its initial segments is equal to 
/l-complexity to within an additive constant. 
Theorem 8.7 (majority theorem). The set of p-chaotic sequences has ,u-measure 1. 
Proof. Let a positive E be fixed. Let us cover the set Z of all p-non-chaotic sequences 
with an open set G having p-measure < E. Let C = 1 - lb(a). By definition, if a is a 
p-non-chaotic sequence then there is n=n(a) such that KA(aln)<K,,(aln) - C. This 
implies c~,4(aln)>~(ain). 
Let us denote by S the set of all s E E such that F~A(S) 3 ,n(s) and no proper prefix s’ 
of s satisfies the inequality EYA(s’) &p(Y). We have 2 C G = /_&, l2, and on the other 
hand p(G) = xsES p(s) <s zAES y,,r(s) <<i: because the semimeasure 7~ is not greater 
than some quasimeasure. 0 
The following theorem [3] strengthens in a sense the preceding one. It states that 
the class of chaotic sequences is rich enough to generate all sequences. This theorem 
is not evident; for example, its analog for the notion of lawlessness is not true. 
Theorem 8.8 (GBcs). Any infinite sequence is computable relative to some q-chaotic 
sequence. (It is worthy to mention that there is a computable operator which gives any 
sequence as its output provided an appropriate chaotic sequence is taken as its input.) 
We omit proof of G&s Theorem. 
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The time is ripe to investigate connection between the chaoticness and the previous 
version of conception of randomness - the unpredictability. 
Theorem 8.9. All u-chaotic sequences are u-unpredictable. 
Proof. If G is an open subset of SL and p(G) < 2~” then the function &,(s) = 2”~ 
(C& n G) is a semimeasure. It suffices to confirm the condition (*) from Lemma 8.3.1. 
If G is enumerable then /Ic,~ is a r.e.b. semimeasure. 
Lemma 8.9.1. If Gf 1), G(2), G(3), . . . is a computable sequence of enumerable open 
subsets of Q and ‘dn u(G(n)) <2-“, then all sequences belonging to nr=, G(n) are 
u-non-chaotic. 
Proof. If for some n p(G(n)) = 0, each sequence from G(n) is p-non-chaotic because 
the a priori semimeasure is positive on all arguments. 
If ‘dn,u(G(n)) # 0 then let us consider the function x = C,“=, 2-“1Vo(2n),2n. It is easy 
to see that CI is a r.e.b. semimeasure. If a sequence b belongs to n,“=, G(n) then 
V’n 3k a(blk)/p(blk) >2” (k suits us if Q blk S G(2n)). As ?A 3ccx for some constant c, 
we obtain that b is p-non-chaotic. 0 
To get Theorem 8.9 we will prove that any p-predictable sequence a is not p-chaotic. 
Let us fix a computable strategy CJ giving the unbounded growth of Man’s capital in 
the p-game against a. Due to Lemma 8.9.1, it suffices to construct (effectively) for 
every n such enumerable open G that a E G and p(G) ~2~“. Let B be the set of such 
b E Q that the strategy CJ gets a capital larger than 2” (at least once) in p-game against 
b. Evidently B is open and enumerable. We claim that u(B) <2-“. 
We will use now Definition 6.2.1.2. It is sufficient to prove that for any S 2 E, 
if Vs, t E S 12~ n Q, = 0 and Y.s E Sp(A,) # 0 then C sES p(&)V(s) < VO. It can be done 
analogously to the proof of Proposition 6.2.2. Note that unlike the present case, in 6.2.2 
there was proved the equality. The cause is that an additional condition Us,__ Q, = Q 
was present in Proposition 6.2.2 but is absent now. 0 
Corollaries 8.10. 1. Theorem 7.2 and hence its Corollary 7.3 (i.e. the majority theo- 
rem for unpredictability) can be obtained as some relativized versions of Theorems 8.9 
and 8.7. To get a proof of Theorem 7.2 we have to consider the strategy u from that 
theorem as an oracle jar the notions connected with computability, i.e. jar chaoticness 
and unpredictability. It means that one needs to relativize Theorems 8.9 and 8.7 to 
that oracle. 
2. A further consequence is a new proof of Corollary 3.5 (i.e. majority theorem 
jar y-stochastic sequences). 
3. An immediate consequence of Theorem 8.9 and Theorem 7.5 is the theorem of 
distinguishing for chaoticness: no sequence is chaotic with respect to two inconsistent 
computable measures. 
A. A. Muchnik et ul. I Throrrticul Computer Scienw 207 (1998) 263-317 297 
4. Using Corollary 7.7 we obtain that there are stochastic non-chaotic sequences. 
Open question 8.11. Are the notions of chaoticness and unpredictability equivalent? 
9. Theorems on complexity deficiency and other features of chaotic, unpredictable 
and stochastic sequences 
Let us consider now the following question. As the class of non-chaotic sequences 
contains a stochastic sequence (Corollary 4 of Theorem 8.9) and it may well be true 
that class contains an unpredictable sequence (this is the open problem posed in the 
end of preceded section), it is natural to ask: for what functions n’ there is a stochastic 
(or unpredictable) sequence a satisfying the inequality KA(aln)<tr ~ d(n) for any 
sufficiently large n. Such function d is often called complexity dgficienc~~. In a more 
narrow sense the term complexity &ficiency denotes the difference n - KA(aIf7). Let 
us remind that if it is not stated otherwise we assume measure to be uniform. It is the 
uniform measure ye that is considered in this section. 
We regard the two first theorems of this section, which connect the properties of 
unpredictability and stochasticness with the behavior of the complexity deficiency. as 
hardly not the most important ones in the present paper. The second of those theorems 
yields the solution of a famous problem of recursion theory which is related with the 
correction of one false assertion posed in the 1960s by A.N. Kolmogorov (see remark 
after the formulation of Theorem 9.2). 
Theorem 9.1 (An.A. Muchnik). Let D he a computuhle total Jimction. ‘411 ~rnprc~- 
&table (i.e. q-unpredictable) sequence a satisfying, jbr any mficiently luryr 12, tlw 
inequa1it.y KA(aln) <n - D(n) exists if and only {f the j&don D is hounded. 
Proof. “IF” part: Let us prove first that if D is bounded then there is an unpredictable 
sequence a satisfying the inequality KA(aln)<n ~ D(n) for any sufficiently large II. 
Let a constant C be given. We have to construct an unpredictable sequence a such 
that KA(aln) <n - C for any sufficiently large n. 
Let us denote 21 = (0,. . . ,O) (I zeros) and Y, = Zj * I. Let us define semimeasure 11 
on z by following conditions: 
p( Y2, ^  t) = 2-‘-‘h(r)-’ for every t E H; if a tuple s has not the form Y2,” t then 
p(s) = 0. 
Of course ,u is recursively enumerable from below (r.e.b.), therefore 3P V~y E z U(X) 
<-lb@(s)) + P. 
For every 1, there exist unpredictable sequences having the prefix Yrl (because almost 
all sequences are unpredictable). For each such sequence b and for every n >21 we 
have KA(bjn)<n - I+ P. Now we take I>C + P. 0 
“ONLY IF” part: Let us prove now that if a function D is unbounded (and com- 
putable) and a sequence a satisfies the inequality KA(aln) <n-D(n) for any sufficiently 
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large IZ then a is predictable. We will construct two computable strategies such that 
one of them will be winning in the game against the sequence a. 
Let us partition the natural row N into the semiintervals Nk = [Q, nk+t ) called zones. 
The sequence nt , n2, n3,. . . will be increasing and computable. Numbers nk are defined 
by induction on k. We set nl = 1. Assume that nk is already defined. Let us define 
?&+I. As D is unbounded, there is n such that n >nk and D(n)>3nk + k. Let us take 
the least such n and set nk+l = n + 1. 
It is very important that in the definition of nk we have not used the sequence a 
itself, but only the function D and its computability. 
We denote by alNk the finite sequence (a(nk), a(nk + 1 ), . . . , a(nk+l - 1)). 
Lemma 9.1.1. For some constant C 
‘ds, t E EKA(t)<KA(s-t) + 21h(s) + C. 
Proof. We can easily see that the function p(t) = Es,__ 2-2ih(S)-‘yA(s^t) is a r.e.b. 
semimeasure. Therefore 3c Vt E E p(t) < qA(t). Taking the logarithm of the previous 
inequality, we have 
KS, t E EKA(t)<KA(s^t) + 2 lb(s) + lb(c) + 3. 0 
Due to Lemma 9.1 .l we have 
Proposition 9.1.2. m(alNk)<nk+l - nk - k + C. 
The idea of construction of two computable strategies is as follows. As the a priori 
semimeasure is recursively enumerable from below, the complexity function U(s) 
is recursively enumerable from above. This means that there is a (total) computable 
function 0 : N -+ N x E such that 
ZWs) = ,${h(l): b(j) =s), where WI = (h(j), MA). 
We denote by Jk(a) the least j such that f&(j) = alNk and e,(j) <rzk+l - nk -k + C. 
Now we will give the most important definition. Let us say that a is a sequence of 
even type if for infinitely many k the inequality J2k_ 1 (a) < Jzk(a) holds; let us say that a 
is a sequence of odd type if for infinitely many k the inequality J2k_1 (a) 2 Jzk(a) holds. 
Clearly, a has at least one of these two types. We will now define two computable 
Man’s strategies - even and odd ones - such that if a has even type then the even 
strategy is winning, and if a has odd type then the odd strategy is winning (in the 
game against a). 
9.1.X The even strategy. Man plays in zones Nk, k E N, in the following order: N2, Ni, 
N~,Ns,NG,N~, . . . . The expression “game in zone Nk” means that Man predicts the 
values of terms of the sequence a with numbers from Nk in natural order: n,+,nk + 1 
and so on; thus, the total number of moves in zone Nk is lk = nk+i - nk. 
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Let us describe Man’s action in zones NZk and Nlk-1. 
Zone &k. Man makes IZk moves, betting on ith move (n2k d i < n2k+ 1) zero on an 
arbitrary value of the ith term. That means that Man finds out aiN2k without changing 
his capital. This knowledge allows Man to compute &(a). 
Zone &k- 1. At first Man constructs a subset S(2k - 1) of the set 1(2k - 1) of all 
sequences of length /2k-r defined as follows: 
8.~ &(j)</2k-, - 2k + 1 + c]} 
That is, S(2k - 1) is the set of all s~Z(2k - 1) such that the values Q(j), j<&(a), 
allow to conclude that KA(s) < /2&i - 2k + 1 + C. 
Each s E S(2k - 1) has complexity m(s)< /2&_1 - 2k + C and therefore ;‘A(.~)> 
exp,[-(/2k_i - 2k + C)]. As the semimeasure ?A is majorized by a quasimeasure, the 
set S(2k - 1) has at most exp,(/zk-t - 2k -1 C) elements. This means that the uniform 
measure of the set S(2k - 1) is at most 2-2k+C. 
On the other hand, if &&i(a)<&(a) then alNIk_i ES(2k - l), therefore Man has 
much information about alNzk_1 (because S(2k - 1) is “small”). 
Having S(2k - 1) Man begins to play in zone N2k_1. He does it as it has been 
described in the proof of item 1 of Theorem 6.1.1, where the measure (cp) is uniform, 
the number of moves (m) is equal to /2k_1, the set (S) is equal to S(2k - 1 ), and 
initial capital is equal to the half of capital which Man had before the beginning of 
the game on (2k - 1)th zone. 
If alNzk_1 $8 S(2k - 1) then Man’s capital decreases at most twice during the game 
on zone N2k- ,. 
If aiNlk_t E S(2k - 1) then Man’s capital increases at least 22k-c-’ times. 
Recall that after the game on zones N2k, N2k_1 Man turns to zones N2k+2, Nzk+l. 
The definition of even strategy is completed. It is clear that the described strategy 
is computable. 
Lemma 9.1.4 IJ’a is a sequence of even type then in the game against a Mm M’ins 
via the even strategy. 
Proof. At the end of the game on the first k pairs of zones the initial capital decreases 
at most 2k times. 
If &_,(a)<&(a) then the current capital increases during the game on the kth 
pair of zones at least 22k-C-’ times. So the initial capital increases in this case at 
least 2k-C times. The condition of Lemma tells that the set of such cases is in- 
finite. 0 
9.1.3.* The odd strategy. The zones are disposed in the order Nl, N2, Ns, N4, N5, Nb, . 
i.e. with inversion in every pair compared to the even strategy. Playing in zone N2k_1 
Man makes zero bets, he keeps his capital and finds out alNzk_1. This enables him to 
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compute &-l(a). Then, as in above case, the sets 1(2k) and S(2k) are defined and 
IS(2k)l<2- 2k+C II ( 2k)l. The strategy of playing on zone Nlk is defined in similar way; 
this strategy increases the current capital at least 22k-C-’ times if &,&i(a)>&(a) and 
decreases the current capital at most twice otherwise. 
Finally we can prove 
Lemma 9.1.4.* If a is a sequence of odd type then in the game against a Man wins 
via the odd strategy. 
Theorem 9.2 (An.A. Muchnik). Let D be a computable total function. Then the fol- 
lowing are equivalent: 
(1) there exists a stochastic (i.e. n-stochastic) sequence a satisfying the inequality 
KA(a(n)dn -D(n) jar any sufJiciently large n; 
(2) for every c>O the inequality D(n)<cn holds for any st@ciently large n. 
Remark. The assertion posed by Kolmogorov which was mentioned in the begin- 
ning of this Section 9 is the following: there exists a stochastic sequence x such that 
H(x’) = O(log I). That assertion, without a proof, can be found in the last paragraphs 
of article 2 of [6,7]. We observe here Kolmogorov’s notations yet are going to explain 
them: x’ is the same as xl1 (in our notations), and H stands for the simple entropy. (On 
various kinds of entropy see, e.g., [19], and also [22].) The simple entropy differs from 
a priori entropy but not too much: IH(s) - ICA( = O(log IsI) for s E E. Therefore, 
Kolmogorov’s statement asserts, in fact, the existence of a stochastic sequence a such 
that KA(ajn) = O(logn). However, this is refuted by Theorem 9.2. The situation with 
Kolmogorov’s assertion was discussed in [20, no. 2.6.51 and in Section 1.6 of [8,9]. 
A slightly weakened version of Theorem 9.2 was published in [21, no. 6.2.31: 
Theorem 9.2’ (An.A. Muchnik). Let w be an injinite sequence of zeros and ones and 
suppose that the entropy of an initial segment of w having length n does not exceed 
En for some CI < 1 and jar any sujliciently large n. Then co is not stochastic. 
Proof of Theorem 9.2. Suppose first that for every c > 0, D(n) <cn for any suffi- 
ciently large n. We have to construct a stochastic sequence a satisfying the inequality 
KA(aln)dn -D(n) for any sufficiently large n. It is clear that without loss of gener- 
ality we may assume that D tends to infinity (if this is not the case then we can add 
lb(n)). 
Let us define d, such that d,’ = 8 maX,GkG2n D(k)/k. Obviously, the sequence d, is 
computable and d, --) 0 (as for any E > 0 there is such k, that D(k) < Ek for all k > k,). 
We claim that xi=, di >4D(n) for all n. Indeed, the definition of d, yields that for 
all m, if n/2 d m <n then di 3 8D(n)/n; therefore xi=, di 3 (n/2)[8D(n)/n]. Thus we 
have C,“=, dz = 00. 
Let us consider the quasiuniform measure p defined by the sequence d, (see the 
statement of Theorem 5.1). The ,u-measure of the set of all v-stochastic sequences is 1 
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(according to 5.4 and 3.14). On the other hand, p-measure of the set of all ,u-chaotic 
sequences is also equal to 1 (Theorem 8.7). Therefore, there are sequences which are 
p-chaotic and q-stochastic simultaneously. Let us fix such a sequence a and prove that 
KA(a(n)dn - D(n) for any sufficiently large n. 
To this end we consider the quasiuniform measure p’ defined by the sequence d,,/2. 
Then p’(aln)2 >p(aln)2-” n;=,(l + di/2) ( see the proof of 5.1). As yA is a maximal 
semimeasure, there is a constant c’ >0 such that yA(aln)3c’p’(aln) for all 11. As a 
is p-chaotic, there is another constant c” >O such that ,u(aln) >c”y~(aln) for all n. 
Therefore, 
n 
;‘A(aln) 3c2T” n (1 + d,?/2), where c = c”(c’)*; 
x=1 
KA(aln)<n - 5 lb(1 + di/2) - C, where C = lb(c). 
k-l 
As 2 <e, then lb( 1 + cl)> c( for small positive x Consequently, 
KA(aln)<n - 2 dz/2 - C - C’bn -- 2&n) - C - C’, 
k=l 
where the term C’ arises because a finite number of dk’s may not satisfy the inequality 
lb(l + (d:/2))>di/2. Thus, KA(aln)dn -- D(n) for any sufficiently large FI (because 
D tends to infinity). 
Let us prove now the inverse implication. Assume that a is a stochastic sequence 
satisfying the inequality KA(aln)<n - D(n) for any sufficiently large IZ and assume 
that D is computable. We have to prove that D grows more slowly than any increasing 
linear function. 
Assume the contrary: there is M > 0 such that D(n) > an for infinitely many n. Without 
loss of generality we may assume that x has the form c( = IV-‘, where A4 E FV. 
L,et us define the computable increasing sequence nk of natural numbers in any way 
to satisfy the following inequalities: 
(1) D(~L+I - L)>r(nk+t - 1). 
(2) nk+, > 2A4(3nk + C) where the constant C is taken from Lemma 9.1.1. 
(3) PQ+~ > 128M2nk. 
Let us denote by Nk the semi-interval [nk,nk+t ). From Lemma 9.1.1 and from the 
conditions (1) (2) it follows that 
KA(aINk) <m(al(?%+t - 1)) + 2nk + C<nk+l(l - a) + hk -+ c 
<(nk+l - nk)(l - 42). 
Further, we define the value Jk(a) and the notions of a sequence of even and odd 
type in the way similar to the way used in the proof of Theorem 9.1. By definition 
Jk(a) is the least j satisfying conditions: 62(j) =alNk and @t(j)< lk(l - r/2) where 
/k =n k+l -nk. 
However, now we need a finer classification of sequences and rules than the classi- 
fication from the proof of Theorem 9.1. We will have a second parameter - a pair of 
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integers z = (zi, ~2) from the set { 0, 1) x [ 1,4M]. Let us begin with the rules of choice 
of subsequences. 
9.2.1. Even (z) rule. As to level of zones (about the term “zone” see the proof of 
Theorem 9.1) the rule acts similar to the even strategy from the proof of Theorem 
9.1. In particular, any even rule scans zones in the order N2, Ni, N4, Ns, N6, Ns,. . . , and 
every “even” zone N2k is scanned only to find out alN2k and no value ai, i E N2k, is 
chosen to be included in the subsequence. 
Then Man computes the set S = S(2k - 1) G Z(2k - 1) (where 1(2k - 1) is the set of 
all binary sequences of length /2k-i = n2k - n2/i__1 and S(2k - 1) is defined in the proof 
of Theorem 9.1). Obviously, S(2k - 1) has at most exp,[Zzk_r (1 - c(/2)] elements and 
ajNzk_i ES(2k - 1) if J2k_i(a)<Jzk(a) (in this case we say that (2k - 1)th zone has 
even type). 
Let us consider the strategy IT constructed in the proof of item 1 of Theorem 6.1.3 
and let us fix the values of parameters of that theorem: m = 12k__1, S = S(2k - 1). The 
winnings of c~ against each element of S are not less than al2k__1/2. Let us define new 
strategy 0’ which bets on the same values as 0, and if /I is bet of 0 then [4Mfi]/4M 
is bet of G’. Clearly the winnings of c’ may differ from the winnings of (T not more 
than by lzk-i/4M = &2&1/4. So the winnings of 0’ are not less than y/2& i/4. 
Now let us divide the strategy 0’ into SM substrategies o,, z E (0, 1) x [1,4M], as 
follows. If 0’ bets on zi and if its bet, multiplied by 4A4, is equal to ~2, then o, does the 
same. In other cases o, bets zero. For every sequence t from S(2k- 1) there is such z 
that the winnings of substrategy 0, against t are not kSS than (a/2& ]/4)/8M = a2 12k_ ]/ 
32. We will call such z for alNzx_-1 the even type of (2k - 1)th zone. 
The even (z) rule takes a term in subsequence iff the bet of a, is positive. As the 
values of all positive bets of ~~ are equal to z2/411/1< 1, then the difference between 
the number of (zi) and the number of (1 - ~1) in chosen from alNzk_1 subsequence 
is not less than the winnings of 0,. If (2k - 1)th zone has the even type z, then 
the even (z) rule guarantees, that the number of (~1) chozen from ajN2k_1 is greater 
than 
12&i/2 + a212k-l/64 = nzk(l/2 + a2/64) - Q&1(1/2 + x2/64) 
> Qk(l/2 + X2/128) + n2kM2/128 - n2k-_1 
> n2k( 112 f a”/l28) 
(due to condition (3)). The length of subsequence chosen from a]nzk is not greater than 
n2k. Thus, we see that the law of large numbers is not true for the chosen subsequence. 
The set of all types and rules is finite, Therefore, it is sufficient to use such rule 
that infinitely many zones have corresponding type for sequence a. 
9.2.1.” Odd (z) rule scans the zones in the order NI, N2, Ns, N4, Ns, Ne,. . . . The dif- 
ference with the even (z) rule is that in every pair Nzk_l,Nzk the roles of zones 
are changed, as in the proof of Theorem 9.1. The notion of odd type of (2k)th 
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zone is introduced in the similar way as for even type. The details are left to the 
reader. 
The computability of all used strategies and rules is obvious. 0 
Theorem 9.3 (An.A. Muchnik). For ewrv computubl~~ strutrgy there exist u rzurnhcr 
L’ >O and N seyuence a such thut 
( 1 ) @r arzq’ nwusure p the strutqy doors not n)in in the p-ganw quin.st a; 
und 
(2) KA(aln)<clb(n) for cl11 n> 1. 
IJ’ the given strategy is monotone or $jbr evtq~ number i, at sowe rnonwnt of’ the 
<JUWc’, it predicts the ith term then there exists u computable sequence a sutisf~\~in~g 
(1) clnd (2). 
This means that there is no universal computable strategy (i.e. strategy which wins 
against all predictable sequences), because the sequence a is predictable due to 
Theorem 9.1. However, for every countable set of strategies there exists universal 
continuous strategy, if we do not require this strategy to belong to that set. 
Proof. Let a computable strategy c~ be given. Let us define by induction on k tht 
sequence of indices nk and the sequence of terms a,, as follows: 
(1) If k = 1 then nl is the number of the first term predicted by strategy (T 
and a,, = 1 - &,, where E,, is the predicted value. 
(2) If k 32 then nk is the number of kth term predicted by strategy (T in the case 
when the true values of (k - 1) before predicted terms are a,,, ,u,,?, . ,u,,,~ ,, and 
a ni = 1 - G,,, where 6,, is the predicted value. 
Of course, the mapping n H a, is computable and possibly is not totally defined. Let 
a,, := 0 for all II that are not included in the sequence nh. 
It is clear that strategy 0 does not win in the game against the defined sequence 
a because all predictions are false. To complete the proof it remains to verify the 
inequality KA(aln) <41b(n) + C for all n (thus, we can take c = 4 + C). It is sufficient 
to construct a r.e.b. semimeasure v such that v(a~n)>n?’ for all n >nl. 
Let us define an auxillary function 1’ :3 + Q. Let .F t Z be a sequence of length n. 
Assume that among the numbers n’dn there are exactly m numbers of the form 
nk. Let these numbers be nk( 11, nk(2). , nkCnl), where k(l)<k(2)< ‘.’ <k(m). We set 
v(s) = VI(S) + Q(S) + + v,,?(s), where v,(s) = PI-’ if 
(1 > St?,,,, = %,?, for all id 1 and 
(2) s,=O for allj<n such that ,j@{nk(,): i<l} 
and VI(S) = 0 else. 
It is clear that 1’ is recursively enumerable from below and that ll(aln) 3 12-A if 113 nl. 
To prove that 1’ is a semimeasure we have to construct a majorizing quasimeasure. Let 
us note that V(S) # 0 only for those sequences s of length n that satisfy ( 1) and (2) 
for some I <nz. The number of such sequences is at most n (as m <n) and for any 
of them V(S) < nnC’ = np3. Consequently, the sum of values v(s) over all binary .P of 
length n is at most ne2. Hence xvtE V(S) is finite. 
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Let us define now z(s) = Et v(t), where the sum is taken over all extensions t of 
the sequence s (including s itself). The function T is nonnegative and satisfies the 
inequality z(s) >z(s^O) + z(s^1) for all s E E. To convert this inequality into equality 
let the value 0(s) be defined by induction on lb(s) as follows: 
(a) @n)=z(n) (where _4 is the empty sequence), 
(b) 8(s^l) =z(sll) and @s-O)== Q(s) - @s-l). 
We can easily verify that 19 is really a quasimeasure majorizing z and, therefore, ma- 
jorizing v. Thus, the proof of the first assertion of theorem is completed. 
The second assertion is in fact also proved: if the given strategy is monotone then 
the assertion is evident and if the given strategy in the game against any sequence 
predicts all its terms, then the sequence constructed in the proof is computable. Cl 
The next theorem yields a computable strategy universal for the class of all com- 
putable sequences for the game with uniform measure q (note that due to Theorem 9.3 
this strategy cannot be monotone). 
Theorem 9.4 (An.A. Muchnik). There is a computable strategy which wins in the 
q-game against any computable sequence. 
Proof. Let us fix a partial computable O-l-valued function fk(n) of two arguments 
universal in the following sense: for every partial computable function f : N ---f (0, 1) 
there are infinitely many k such that f(n) = fk(lt) for all IE (as it is usual in the study of 
partial functions, the equality means that if one hand side is defined then the other hand 
side is also defined and both hand sides are equal). The set F = {(k, n, i}: fk(n) = i} is 
recursively enumerable; there is a tuple of total computable functions i, C, i” such that 
F={~(l)=(~(l),~(l),~(E)): ZEN} 
We define by induction on k the sequence of numbers nk: ~1 = 1 and &+i = & + k 
for all k. Let Nk denote the semi-interval [nk, nk+i ) in N. 
We define Ik = min{ 1: V?Z E Nk 31’ < 2 [k = ,&( i’), n = g( E’), fk(lt) = i”( l’)]}. We can 
say that 2k is the number of operations which is spent for computing of fk(n) for all 
it E Nk. (As fk may be non-total, Ek can be equal to +cc.) We define K = {k E N 1 Ek 
< +a~}. Let k[l], k[2], k[3], . . . be the recursive enumeration of K without repetitions. 
The mapping m H k[m] is computable and is total (because there are infinitely many 
k such that fk is total). 
Now let us turn to the description of the strategy. Let the initial capital be 1. The 
game is divided into infinitely many steps: step 1, step 2, step 3,. . . . The step m is 
as follows. Man computes k =k[m], Ek, all tuples z(E) = (l(Z),n”(E),$l)), 161k, and 
using them Man computes Sk(n) for all n E Nk. Man takes 2-k as initial capital for this 
step. Then he makes k moves, on nth move he bets his current capital on the value 
fk(nk + n - I) of the term with number (nk + p1 - 1). 
Obviously, if a,, = fk(u) for all n E Nk, then Man increases 2k times the capital 2-k 
on the step m. In this case the current capital after executing the step number m is 
increased by 1 - 2-k 2 0.5. In other case, i.e. if a, # fk(n) for some II E Nk, Man loses 
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the capital 2-k. Therefore the sum of losses during all steps is not greater than I. On 
the other hand, if the sequence a is computable, then for infinitely many k the equality 
a, = fj(n) holds for all n, hence on infinite number of steps Man adds a capital greater 
than i. This means that the capital is unbounded and even tends to infinity in the game 
against a. 0 
Theorem 9.5 (An.A. Muchnik). For every computable monotone function J’tending to 
infinity there exists a sequence a which Man cannot \vin against if he uses on1.y mono- 
tone strategies (i.e. a is monotonically unpredictable) and such that KA(aln)<f’(n) 
lb(n) for any suficiently large n. 
Proof. We shall mean that monotone strategies bet zero on omitted terms. Let us 
consider an auxillary computable monotone function y : N + N tending to infinity such 
that g(n) <Ib(n + 1). Its values will be fixed at the end of the proof. For any i E N let 
h(i) be equal to the least n such that g(n)>i. 
Now we will define three sequences by simultaneous induction on n. These sequences 
are: s,EZ”, M,C[l,g(n)], v,EQ. For n=O we set: so=n, Me=@, vo=l. Assume 
that we have already defined nth terms. For (n + 1) we have the following. Let us 
consider values of first g(n) monotone strategies (in some natural numeration) on the 
argument s,. M,+t is the union of M, and the set of numbers from [I, y(n)] of those 
monotone strategies which are not defined on s,. Let y’(t) be the current capital of 
ith monotone strategy after kth move if alk = t. Let us consider the next two sums: 
UO=~~~~(‘)-‘~~,(S,~~) and u, =C2-h(i)--IV,t,,(S,,^l), 
, I 
where i E [ 1, g(n)]\Mn+l. If uo GUI then v,+i = ug, s,+, = s, ^  0; and if ~1 <u. then 
a,+1 =ui, Sntl =sn ^ l. 
It is easy to check the next inequalities 
VIZ+ I G U,I for g(n) = g(n - 1) and 
v,+i <v, + 2P(“) for else. 
For this check we use the fact that ( I$:,(tA O)+I$+l(t^ 1))/2 = q(t) (for all i E N, t E 5 
and k= ItI), and that &‘(t)<2k. So v,<vo+~~, 22’=2 for all n, therefore ci(sn)<2, 
2h(i)+i for all i $M,, and n> h(i). 
We define aln = s,. If ith monotone strategy is defined in the game against a on 
all moves, then v,‘(a]n) is bounded. If ith monotone strategy is not defined in the 
game against a on some move, then i will belong to appropriate A&. In all cases ith 
monotone strategy does not win against sequence a. 
It remains to bound the entropy of a. Let us define a r.e.b. semimeasure p as 
follows. First, we define by induction on ItI an auxillary r.e.b. function pL(t) with two 
arguments: t E E and L which is a tuple of length (t/ and kth element of L is a subset 
of [l, g(k)] (where L(k) c L(k + 1)). We set pi = 1. Assume that for all L values 
pL( t) are defined. Let n be equal to ItI and P be a tuple of length (n + 1). We want to 
define pp( t *O) and pp(t ^  1). At first we compute (n + 1 )th moves of monotone strategies 
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with numbers from [I,g(n)]\P(n) in the game against t. If one of such strategies is not 
defined on (n + 1)th move in the game against t then Ilp(t -0) = pp(t -1) = 0. In another 
case we consider two sums: uo = xi 2-h(i)Pi~~l(t ^O) and ~1 = xi 22h(‘)-iti+l(t^ 1) 
where i E [ 1, g(n)]\P(n). Let Uj be the least of two sums. Now we set pp(t ^ ( 1 -j)) = 0 
and pp(t^j)=pM(t) . SI where M=Pln,a= 1 - (n + 1))’ if P(n + l)=P(n) and 
cr=(n + 1)-3 if P(n + l)#P(n). 
It is easy to verify that pi is really a r.e.b. function and that p(t) = CM pi is 
a semimeasure (use that g(n) <lb(n + 1) and induction on n). For the sequence M,,, 
defined in the construction of a, we have 
p(alk) >pp(alk) 3(k-3)gfk) E (1 - mP2), 
m=2 
where P(n) =M, for all n. Therefore KA(alK) < 3g(k)lb(k) + C where C does not de- 
pend on k. Hence, KA(aIk)<f(k)lb(k) for any sufficiently large k, if g(k)< 
f(k)P. q 
Corollary 9.5.1. Theorems 9.2 and 9.5 (for f(n) = lb(n)) imply that there exists a 
monotonically unpredictable sequence which is not stochastic. 
By Theorem 7.4 the sequence constructed in 9.5.1 is also predictable. 
Note that there exist a monotonically predictable sequence with a large a priori 
entropy (Corollary 7.7, Theorem 9.2) and a montonically unpredictable sequence with 
a small a priori entropy (Theorem 9.5). The fact that monotonical predictability is not 
correlated with a priori entropy is rather interesting. 
It is interesting that some important results (e.g. Theorem 9.7) about randomness 
with respect to a measure p can be obtained for sequences which are chaotic with 
respect to some (another) measure v. 
Definition 9.6. Let us call a sequence a natural if there is a computable measure v 
such that a is v-chaotic. 
Theorem 9.7 (An.A. Muchnik). For any computable measure ,u, the notions of 
p-chaoticness and p-unpredictability are equivalent in the class of natural sequences: 
a natural sequence is ,u-unpredictable if and only if it is p-chaotic. 
Proof. For “zj” see Theorem 8.9. 
“Only if”. Let us suppose that a sequence a is a natural and let v be a computable 
measure such that a is v-chaotic. Let a be p-non-chaotic where p is a computable 
measure. We have to prove that a is p-predictable. 
The winning strategy will be continuous, i.e. on kth move it will predict kth term 
of a. And it will satisfy the following property: let V(s) denote Man’s capital after the 
game according to the strategy against finite sequence s, then V(s) = v(s)/p(s). 
Assume that there is such a (computable) strategy. As a is v-chaotic, the ratio 
yA(aln)/v(a]n) is bounded, whereas the ratio yA(a]n)/p(aln) is unbounded, therefore 
the ratio v(aln)/p(a] ) n is unbounded, i.e. Man wins in ,u-game against a. 
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It remains to define a computable strategy satisfying the above condition with initial 
capital V” = r(jl)/p(A). But this problem is already solved: as v is a measure, the 
following equality holds: 
V(s)p(s) = V(s^O)p(YO) + V(s^l)p(s^l). Then we apply the Proposition 6.2.5. 
We would note that the constructed strategy depends only on ,H and v but not 
on a. The case when p(ain) = 0 is easy. 0 
Let us not forget that the problem 8.1 1 of existence of an unpredictable non-chaotic 
sequence is open. 
The following theorem states that we cannot strengthen Theorem 9.7 by asserting 
that for natural sequences chaoticness is equivalent to stochasticness. 
Theorem 9.8 (van Lambalgen-ShenMuchnik). There exists u stochastic nuturul 
sequence which is predictable (and hence non-chaotic) tzlith respect to the unifbrm 
meusure. (Cf. [21, no. 6.2.41.) 
Proof. We refer here to Corollary 3.14, Proposition 5.4, Theorems 8.7, 8.9, 5.1, 7.5. 
Those assertions imply the following. To get the required sequence it suffices to take 
any sequence which is chaotic relative to a quasiuniform measure with the parameter 
(~1, pz, p3 . .) such that d, tends to zero very slowly (where d,, = pn ~ 0.5 as in 
Theorem 5.1 ). The details are left to the reader. 0 
Open question 9.9. Is there a computable strategy which wins in the game against all 
predictable natural sequences? 
We conclude this section with the theorem related with the notion of lawlessness 
introduced in Section 2. 
Theorem 9.10 (An.A. Muchnik). All luwless sequences ure predict&e ( ~Y~I 
monotonicull?~) with respect to ever?’ computable meusure and, therefi,re, ure not 
nutural. 
Proof. We will consider first the case of the uniform measure 9. The strategy which 
wins in q-game against any lawless sequence a is rather simple: on kth move it bets 
the half of current capital on value 0 of kth term of the seauence. 
It is clear that after k moves the current capital is equal to V0(0.5)‘(~)( I .5)0’k), where 
O(k) and l(k) denote the amount of zeros and ones, respectively, among k first terms 
of the sequence a. Therefore it is sufficient to prove that there are arbitrary large k 
such that all terms a,,, k dn <3k, are equal to zero. 
This follows from the lawlessness of a. Assume that this is not true; then for any 
sufficiently large k the segment a(k is continued in a by a sequence which has no 
prefix 000.. .O (2k times). 
Now, let us consider general case. Let ,u be a computable measure. The computable 
strategy is as follows. On the kth move it bets the half of current capital on the value 
i of kth term of the sequence a, where i is defined as follows. Let s = al(k - 1 ), then 
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i = 0 if p(s*0) d ~“(3~1 ) and i = 1 else. Again there are arbitrary large k such that Man 
has at least 2k wins in succession after kth move (here we use computability of p) 
and every win increases his capital at least 1.5 times. 0 
10. Finite sequences: unpredictability and chaoticness 
From the point of view that is accepted in this paper only those mathematical as- 
sertions have a real meaning that deal only with finite objects. We consider infinite 
“sets” (if they are not euphemisms, for example, when speaking about infinite com- 
putable sequences rather than about algorithms computing them) as not more than a 
tool for really important analysis of finite objects (we mean a wide sense including the 
heuristics). 
According to this concept, we consider the results of previous section as the results 
helping us to find a right way of analysis of the concept of randomness ofjinite objects 
in algorithmic probability theory. 
Of course, in the finite case the notion of randomness has no absolute meaning. 
We have to find a way to measure the amount of randomness. A helpful tool for this 
measuring is the notion of complexity, as well as in the infinite case; but now we need 
another version of this notion - the conditional entropy. 
Proceeding to the case of finite objects one should not only replace the unconditional 
entropy by the conditional one; one should also modify the very structure of the set 
E. Up to here E was treated as the set of finite initial segments of infinite sequences, 
and we had to know whether one of such segments is an extension of another seg- 
ment. The structure of E was a tree structure. This standpoint manifested itself in the 
additive clause of the definition of a quasimeasure in no. 3.3.4 and hence, implicitly, 
in Definition 8.1. Now, in the finite case, we deal with the elements of B as with sep- 
arate, discrete objects, paying no attention to the extension relation. So in this case the 
structure B is a bunch structure (cf. [19, no. 1.31). By this cause there is no additive 
requirement, which connects the values of x,x*0,x A 1, in Definition 10.1 below. 
Definition 10.1. A conditional semimeasure on the set X with the space of conditions 
VW is any function v : W x X + [0, +co) such that CxEX v,(x) < 1 for all w E VW. (We 
write v,(x) instead of v(w,x).) The elements of VW are called conditions. 
let w and X be constructive spaces. (A constructive space is a set with an effective 
bijection onto IY.) We give the following 
Definition 10.2, A conditional semimeasure is recursively enumerable from below 
(r.e.b. in brief) if the “undergraph” 
{(w,x,q) E w x x x Q: q<v,(x)} 
is recursively enumerable. 
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Let 5% and VV be fixed. Then, as in the case of semimeasures and with the similar 
quasiordering (see Section S), the family of all conditional semimeasures recursively 
enumerable from below has the greatest conditional semimeasure. For every pair of 
constructive spaces W, X we fix one of the greatest conditional recursively enumerable 
form below semimeasures on X with conditions from w. This semimeasure is denoted 
by p. Thus, the value p,,(x) is defined. (We suppose that the sets VW and X are fixed 
together with bijections from those sets onto W, this fixation will be done in every 
context. We have no space here to discuss the dependence of the definition on fixed 
bijections.) In particular, the notation pll(s) will mean that we are considering the 
conditional semimeasure on the set Z of all finite binary sequences with conditions 
from the set of natural numbers. 
Definition 10.3. The semimeasure p is called the greutest conditionul semimeasurr. 
The complexity K : VW x X 4 N defined by equality K,c(x) = [-lb(p,,(x)) + l] is called 
the conditional entropy. In particular, we denote by K,, the conditional entropy when 
the condition is n E N. 
For each kind of entropy (see [I9 or 221) there exists the conditional variant. 
Thus, if p’ is another r.e.b. conditional semimeasure of X with conditions from WV 
then there is a positive constant c such that p{,.(x) ~cp~~(x) for all x,u’. 
The notation [)M.,,,,JI (x) (with a pair or a longer tuple of conditions) will mean that 
the set of conditions WV is the Cartesian product VU, x VW1 and Wi E W,. The meaning 
of notation K ,,.,,, v2 conforms to that. 
We begin the analysis of finite case with the study of finite games and unpredictabil- 
ity. We suppose for convenience that initial Man’s capital is equal to one. Suppose 
also that a computable quasimeasure ,U on 2 is fixed in sense of Definitions 3.3.4 and 
3.3.6. 
Now we are going to present an analog of the notion of predictability for finite 
sequences. However, at first we need to clarify some points concerned with game 
against a finite sequence. Let us fix some n E N and consider the case when Man 
plays in the game “For cash’ (described in Section 6.1) against a finite sequence s E E 
of length n. Let us change the rules of that game as follows: Man can choose the 
terms for prediction in any order. The rule of changing capital is like the rule in 
infinite p-game (see Section 6.2). 
Definition 10.4. We will denote by VU, the set of all rational-valued probabilistic mea- 
sures on the set I” of binary sequences of length n. Thus, M, consists of all functions 
defined on I” with values in the set of positive rational numbers such that the sum of 
all values is equal to 1. 
It is reasonable to take any measure p E tUn as the measure presented in the rule of 
changing the capital. Let us call the resulting game the p-game. Any Man’s strategy in 
/c-game is a finite object and instead of the requirement of computability of a strategy 
we will measure its complexity (better to say, its entropy). In the finite case without 
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loss of generality we may consider only totally defined and correct strategies that make 
exactly n moves in the game against any sequence of length n. The set of all such 
strategies is denoted by C(n). Let us call Man’s capital after the nth move in the game 
according to a strategy cr E E(n) against a sequence s of length n the jinal capital and 
let us denote it by V”(s) (remind that the initial capital is equal to 1). 
Definition 10.5. Let a, p, N E N and let ,D E M,. A sequence s EZ” is called p-a-p- 
predictable if there is a strategy D such that K,(o) <a and V”(S) > 2p in the p-game 
against S. 
Let us explain why it is natural to compare the complexity of a strategy with 
the logarithm of amount of winnings. Both parameters a and /I express in a sense 
the complexity or quantity of information. Assume, for example, that Man knows the 
values of p first terms of the sequence s (B < n = lb(s)), i.e. Man possesses j3 bits of 
information about S, then he can make the final capital to be equal to 2fi in q-game 
against S. One can easily verify that the conditional entropy K,, of the meant strategy 
is about B (to within additive terms 2 lb(P) + C). Thus, if Man possesses p bits of 
information about s then he can hope get the capital 2 8. Suppose that less information, 
for example, CI bits, where a </3, is enough to get the capital 28. This assumption 
restricts the class of sequences, and the exact formulation of this restriction is P-M-P- 
predictability. In other words, if we have a strategy 0 of complexity K,(a)= a and 
wish to win the capital 2fl (i.e. greater than naturally expected 2’) we need j3 - c( 
additional bits of information about S. The existence of such an information means 
P-a-P-predictability. 
As we see, the difference /3 - a is essential. Let us denote 6 =/i’ - a. 
Definition 10.6. A sequence s of length n is called /.&-chaotic if p,(s) <2”p(s). A se- 
quence which is not p-&chaotic is called p-b-nonchaotic. 
As in infinite case, the following theorem holds 
Theorem 10.7. Every p-cc-/Gpredictable s quence s of length n is p-(/3 - tl + C)- 
nonchaotic, where C is a constant not depending on n, u, /3 and s. 
Proof. Let us define vn(t) = 0 if lh(t)#n and vn(t) = C,,Ez(nj pn(o>Vu(t)p(t) if 
lh(t)=n. 
We claim that v is a recursively enumerable from below conditional semimeasure 
on E. The recursively enumerability from below follows from the recursively enu- 
merability from below pn. Thus, it remains to verify that C, v,(s)< 1 for all n. We 
have 
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But the inner sum is equal to 1 for any strategy CJ (the analog of the Proposition 6.2.2). 
Hence C, v,(s) = C OEz(n) p,(a) < 1, as p is a semimeasure. 
Thus v is really r.e.b. conditional semimeasure. Therefore, there is a constant c such 
that p,(s) 30,(s) for all n and s. 
Let s be a P-g-P-predictable sequence of length n and let CJ E C(n) be a strategy 
such that K,(a) <a and V’(s) >2p. We obtain p,(s)3cpn(~)vu(s)~(s) 3c2-“28~(,) = 
2fi-‘+cp(,), where C = lb(c). [7 
Theorem 10.8. The u-measure of the set of all u-&nonchaotic sequences of given 
length n (i.e. the sum of u-measure of all elements from this set) is at most 2~‘. 
Proof. If a sequence s is p-b-nonchaotic then p,(s) >l(s)2”. When s ranges the set 
of all ,u-&nonchaotic sequences, the sum of all left hand sides of this inequality does 
not exceed 1 and the sum of right hand sides is equal to the p-measure of this set 
multiplied by 26. 0 
Now we give the last main definition of our paper. 
Definition 10.9. A sequence s of length n is called B-&natural if there is a measure 
p E M, such that s is p-6-chaotic and &O(P) < 8. (Recall that the subscript nd means 
the code of pair (n,t3).) A not O-b-natural sequence is called &&unnatural. 
Kolmogorov put the following question: are there (if (3 and 6 satisfy some reason- 
able requirements) &%unnatural sequences? Shen’ [17] gave the positive answer, then 
V’yugin [25, Theorems 2 and 31 estimated the measure of the set of &&unnatural 
sequences. Muchnik improved that estimate and it got its final form. Let us denote, 
for the set U C I”, by pw[U] the sum CsE,_ p,Js); the expression p[U] for p E M, is 
understood in a similar way. We use this notation in order to make differences with the 
expression pw( U), which means a measure (i.e. the greatest conditional semimeasure I 
of U as a finite object. We denote by U,,HJ the set of all O-&unnatural sequences of 
length n. 
Theorem 10.10 (AnA. Muchnik). For all st.@iciently large positive integers n, 0, 6, 
[f 6<n - 38 then ~122” <p,,e[U,,es] <c22-‘, where cl, c2 are positive constants not 
depending on n, 8, 6. 
Proof. The lower bound. In fact we will construct a single sequence s E U,,H~ that will 
insure the inequality P~Q[U~~~] >2-“cl and simultaneously we will define cl. We will 
use a technical lemma which in spite of simplicity may have many other applications: 
Lemma 10.10.1. If f is computable function then K,,,(f(w,x))<K,(x) + C for at1 
x from the domain of fw, where C is a constant not depending on x, w. (We write 
fw(x) instead off (w,x).) 
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Proof. Let us set y,&) = C, pw(x), where the sum is over the set of all x such that 
f(w,x) =y. It is easy to check that the function y is a r.e.b. conditional semimea- 
sure. Then p,(f(w,x)) 3 cyw(f(w,x)) > c&x), which implies the desired inequality 
for C = 1 - lb(c). 0 
Let us denote by M,,H the set of all measures p E M,, satisfying the inequality 
M(P) >2-“. Th e set M,,o contains at most 2O measures. For ,u EM,,~ we define TP = 
{,s E I” : ,u(s)>~@“}. Every T, has less than 2”-” elements, therefore, there is a 
sequence of length n which belongs to no set T,, p E M,,o. Let us denote by s, the 
lexicographically least such sequence. 
Lemma 10.10.2. pn~(s,,)>c12-‘, where cl is a constant not depending on n and 8. 
Proof. Let M = UnEN Min. As p is recursively enumerable from below, there is a com- 
putable function h : N --f N x Ml x Q whose range coincides with the “undergraph” of 
the semimeasure p. For /.L E M,,o we denote by iP the least i such that h(i) = ((n, f3), p, r), 
for some Y >2-“. One can easily verify that i, # i,, if p # v. Let us take the measure 
p E M,o with maximal value of i,. 
Given p, n, 8 we can compute M,o as a finite object (using h we at first find the 
number i, and then using the values h(i), i d iP we find all other measures from Mne). 
On the other hand, given n, 0 and Mno we can find s,. Applying Lemma 10.10.1 we 
get ZQ(S~)>P~&)C for a constant c not depending on n, 8. As pn&) >2-‘, we get 
Pno(Sn)>c*2-8. 17 
Thus, it remains to prove that s, E Unos. Let a measure ,u E M, satisfy the inequality 
K&L) < 0, that is ZL EM,,~. We have to prove that s, is not Z&-chaotic, i.e. that 
p,(s,)32”p(s,). Because of the choice of s, we have s, # T,, that is p(s,)d2”-“. 
On the other hand, we have proved that p,e(s,) >2-‘c for a constant c not depending 
on n and 0. Let us use the auxiliary inequality: pn(s)ac’8-2p,o(s), where c’ is a 
constant not depending on n,8 and s. (Proof: the function v,(s)=O.5 x0 B-2p,o(s) is 
recursively enumerable from below and is majorized by a measure since C iP2 <2.) 
Hence p,4s,) > &Y22-“, where c is a (new) constant not depending on n,6). 
As ~(s,)<2~-“, we get P~(s~)>c~(s~)~~-~~~~-~. If (3is sufficiently large then the 
last inequality implies P~(.s~)>~(.s~)~“-~~. If 6<n-30 then we obtain P~(s~)>~(s~)~‘. 
Now, the upper bound of Theorem 10.10. It is sufficient to construct a measure 
p E Mno such that p,,e[H,s] ~2~~~2, where HP6 is the set of all ,u-Snonchaotic se- 
quences (of length n) and c2 is a constant. 
This measure p is constructed as follows. Let a number k < 9 be fixed. Let us denote 
by r = r&k the greatest rational number with denominator 20pk which is less than the 
sum CsEIn p&s). We claim that given r, n, fl and k we can compute a semimeasure 
v = V&k on I” such that v(s) <p,,~(s) for all s E I” and CsEIn v(s)>r. Indeed, let us 
execute the procedure of generating of all pairs (q, s) such that s E I”, q E 01, q < p&s). 
Let i= i, be the first step on which it is generated many enough pairs to prove that 
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EVE,,, bin 3~. Take as I’= V,~X the obtained “lower” approximation of /),,(I. Finally, 
take as bl= P~CJ~ the measure from Mm, obtained from v by increasing the value r(sg ). 
where SO is the sequence consisting of n zeros, to obtain ~,sE,~V ,u(s) = I. So, Al (like 
v) can be computed given r, n, II and k. 
Applying the analog of Lemma 10.10. I we get Q,,,I~(P) >cp,ox(r), where c is a 
constant not depending on n,B, k and r. As Y is in fact a binary sequence of length 
O-k we have /~,~,,k(r) 3~32 ‘-” for some constant ~3 (to prove this we have to con- 
sider the measure (P~~~~(s)=~~~~’ if s E I”-’ and (P~H~(.F) = 0 else). As in the proof 
of the lower bound, we can prove that o,&Q~) 3 c’k~2/),1(,~(~(,~01,). Thus, from three 
last inequalities, we conclude that ~~ci(l_l~,,a)3c4k~‘2”2~” where CJ is a constant not 
depending on n, 0, and k. For sufficiently large k < 0 we get ~),&,,~j~ ) >2--“. 
Thus, it remains to verify that Q~~J[H/,J] <c222”. 
Note that if s E H[lcj then p,(s) B,~(s)2”. Clearly, I)~o(s) a~.“p,,(s). Therefore, for 
every s E H,,J the inequality pnn(s) > ~(s)2”c” holds. If 6 is sufficiently large then 
the last inequality implies P,,,!(S) 32~(.~). Therefore, /I~,,[H,~~,,I 3 2p[H,,,j], or p,,~[/f,,,] ~~ 
P[ff~dl 3 Pd1[HpSlP. 
By construction of v and p the left hand side of the last inequality is at most 2’-“. 
Therefore, p,l,~[H,t~j] < 2 k+‘2P1’ As the choice of k does not depend on n,O,O WC can . 
define ~=2”~‘. 0 
We conclude this section with the discussion of an another possible definition of 
chaoticness and naturalness. Namely, let us say that a binary sequence s of length n is 
p-ii-chaotic> in the second sense if p,,(s) <~“,u(s) (the difference with Definition 10.6 
is that /I is added as an additional condition). The definition of O-ci-IIutUrLllrlrss it7 the 
second sense is obtained from the Definition IO.9 by replacing p-&chaoticness with 
/c-&chaoticness in the second sense. 
What version is more reasonable? We think that if the measure ,U is given and we 
estimate the probability of appearing of sequences, then it is reasonable to relativize the 
a priori probability with the measure (the second version). Conversely, if we already 
have a sequence and search for a simple measure relative to which our sequence is 
random then it is reasonable to relativize the a priori semimeasure with the length but 
not with the measure (the first version). 
Theorem IO. 10 for the new definition becomes the following Theorem IO. I I : 
Theorem 10.11 (An.A. Muchnik). For all suficiently Iqye posititle inteyeu.r n, 0.6, if’ 
O<ii<n-30 then ~,2~“dp~~[U,~~~~]~c?2-“, Lvhere UAlod is the set qf’ull O-&unnutmd 
in the second sense sequences und cl. cl are constants not dependiny on n, 0,6. 
Proof. The lower bound can be obtained from the proof of the lower bound of The- 
orem 10.10 as follows. We have to prove that p,,,(s,)~2”~~(.~,) (we use the notation 
introduced before Lemma 10.10.2). Let us make use of the proven inequality: 
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On the other hand, pnP(sn)>c’pn(sn) where c’ does not depend on n and p. Hence, 
if 8 is sufficiently large and 6 <n - 38, then the inequality p,Js,,) 32”,u(s,) holds. 
Let us turn to the upper bound. We denote by HLa the set of all sequences (of length 
n) ,u-b-nonchaotic in the second sense. We want to prove that pn~[HLs] <2-‘c for the 
measure ,u constructed in the proof of the upper bound of Theorem 10.10 (remind that 
p depends on the parameter k). 
We have p,,(s) >2’p(s) for all s E HLb and we want to replace in this inequality 
the subscript p by the subscript 8. 
Thus, we have 
Let us denote by X, Y and Z the multipliers in the left hand side of last inequality. 
Then X d c’ for a constant c’ not depending on n, 0, p, and s. Secondly, we consider 
the set HI of all s for which Z>2. By construction of the measure p CsEI”(~,&s) - 
p(s)) < 2k-e. Hence p,~[Hi] < 2 kii2-D. Thirdly, we consider the set Hz of all s for 
which Y 3(c’)-‘2’-‘. We see that p,e[Hz] <c’2’-‘p,,s[H2] <2c’2-” and for 6 > 19 we 
have p,o[H~] d2c’2-‘. 
However, it is clear that HLh C HI U Hz. Thus, we can take c2 = 2c’ + 2kf’. (In the 
previous proof the use of pnPu is not necessary, but in other cases it can be useful.) 
q 
11. Open questions 
For the convenience of the reader we remind here the mathematical problems having 
been arisen in our paper. 
1. Are the notions of chaoticness and unpredictability equivalent? 5 
2. Is there a computable strategy which wins in the game against all predictable 
natural sequences? 
12. A philosophical supplement 
The discussion of philosophical problems related with the exposed results began in 
the Introduction. Let us return to that discussion. 
As it was mentioned in the Introduction, the appearance of the tuple consisting of 
20 zeros is surprising and the appearance of the tuple say 01111011001101110001 is
not surprising. Now, when the mathematical basis of the theory has been formulated in 
Sections l-10, we can try to explain, in more formal terms, the causes of our surprise 
or its absence. 
’ As it is clear, the definitions of these notions are of different topological nature: chaoticness, by definition, 
is &-formula (3V) whereas unpredictability is I73-formula (V strategy 3 bound of capital V number of a 
move (current capital does not exceed the bound)). 
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As it was mentioned in the commentary to the Definition 8.4, the a priori entropy, 
as a function of a tuple, is defined to within an additive constant term; to say more 
precisely: to within an additive bounded function. Thus, the final choice of a function 
to be the entropy is arbitrary within the said limits; therefore, it is meaningless to 
speak on the value of the entropy of an individual object. However, one may hope 
that there are more natural as well as less natural entropies, and we will admit this 
assumption. Though no natural mathematical definition of what is a good, or natural, 
entropy function is known to the authors, the authors nevertheless believe that it is 
possible, in theory, to distinguish good (natural) entropy functions. Presuming that 
this distinguishing is possible, we can consider that the tuple consisting of only zeros 
has small entropy and therefore has large complexity deficiency (provided the tuple is 
sufficiently large). Let us remind that the complexity deficiency is the length of a tuple 
minus its a priori entropy. 
We think that the cause of surprise in the above example is the amount of complexity 
deficiency. Namely, we are surprised if that amount is large. 
Remark 1. The above statement is true only for the uniform distribution; however, it 
can be generalized to an arbitrary case. In the general case, we have to replace the 
complexity deficiency with the randomness deficiency. The randomness deficiency of a 
tuple is the absolute value of the logarithm of its probability minus its a priori entropy. 
In the uniform case, the absolute value of the logarithm of the probability becomes the 
length and the randomness deficiency becomes the complexity deficiency. 
Our discussion of the reasons to qualify an event as surprising have direct connec- 
tions with basic problems of the mathematical statistics. One of those problems is as 
follows. Let a finite sequence of zeros and ones, or a tuple, appear in an experiment; 
the following problem arises: to find a probability distribution with respect to which the 
sequence is not surprising. According to our agreement, we identify the surprise with a 
large amount of the randomness deficiency. Then the problem becomes to have an exact 
mathematical meaning (let us remind that we fixed some particular a priori entropy). 
In this refined form, the problem was posed by A.N. Kolmogorov in the 1960s 
and 1970s before participants of his seminar at Moscow State University. Kolmogorov 
accompanied his refinement of the statistical problem by the following two natural 
questions - the question whether the required distribution is unique and the question 
whether it exists. It is rather obvious that the required distribution is, in general case, not 
unique. It turned out, that the required distribution may not exist, this was discovered 
by Shen’ ([17]; cf. [8, Section 2.51, [9, Section 2.51). The question whether this state 
of affairs is real belongs to philosophy and to natural science but not to mathematics. 
The question is concerned with the structure of the real world and consists in the 
following. Is there a sequence in the real world which has no adequate probability dis- 
tribution, i.e., no distribution with respect to which the sequence is not surprising? We 
can state as a hypothesis that such a sequence does not exist ~ in the reality, not in the 
world of mathematical abstractions. In other words, in the real physical world, there 
316 A.A. Muchnik et 01. I Theoretical Computer Science 207 (1998) 263-317 
are no “inherently surprising” sequences, i.e., sequences that remain surprising under 
any changes of probabilistic assumptions. This hypothesis is ascribed sometimes to 
Kolmogorov; however, the authorship by Kolmogorov is doubtful. It would be more 
right to say that hypothesis was discussed among participants of the Kolmogorov sem- 
inar, therefore we will call it “Kolmogorov Seminar Hypothesis”. 
Remark 2. In the case of infinite sequences the “Kolmogorov Seminar Hypothesis” 
looks as follows: any infinite sequence present in the nature is chaotic with respect to 
some computable probability distribution, i.e., is natural in the sense of Definition 9.6. 
Thus the hypothesis warrants the use of the term “natural” in that definition. Of course, 
we abstract ourselves from the fact that infinite sequences do not exist in the nature 
at all. 
The following consideration may be opposed to “Kolmogorov Seminar Hypothesis”. 
Let us write down all the finite sequences in succession, then inherently surprising 
sequences will appear some time or other: indeed, their existence was proved by Shen’. 
However, the getting of any individual finite sequence requires, in this process, very 
large amount of time ~ exponential of the length of the sequence. We can consider 
that time greater than the time of existence of the Universe in which the “Kolmogorov 
Seminar Hypothesis” is true. 
On the other hand, the following finite analog of Gacs’ Theorem (i.e., Theorem 8.8) 
is true (and can be proved simpler than the infinite analog): 
any jinite sequence can be obtained as the result of certain simple (i.e. having a 
simple description j transjbrmation of an appropriute chaotic jinite sequence having 
the length approximately equal to the entropy of the given sequence. 
It may seem that this finite analog makes inconsistent 
(1 j the Kolmogorov Seminar Hypothesis and 
(2) the identifying the surprise with the large amount of complexity deficiency. 
Indeed, we should consider the chaotic finite sequence which, as the result of a simple 
transformation, the surprising finite sequence can be obtained from, as surprising, too; 
but that sequence cannot be surprising since it has small complexity deficiency (as it 
is chaotic j. 
However, the inconsistency is seeming. The transformation (though having a simple 
description) can require very large amount of time. And we have already pointed out 
the crucial role of time of process durations. 
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